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We analyze the effects of the 2011 Egyptian protests on the relative labor market conditions of 
women using panel information from the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS). We 
construct our measure of intensity of the protests – the governorate-level number of “martyrs” 
(i.e., demonstrators who died during the protests) - using unique information from the 
Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution. We find that the 2011 protests have reduced 
the gender gap in labor force participation by increasing women’s unemployment and private 
sector employment. The political change has mostly affected the relative labor market 
outcomes of women in households at the bottom of the pre-revolution income distribution. We 
link these findings to the literature showing how a relevant shock to the labor division between 
women and men may have long run consequences on the role of women in society. 
JEL Classifications: J16, J21, J22, J30. 





 ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﺒﺗﺮﺘﻤﻟا رﺎﺛﻵا ﻞﯿﻠﺤﺘﺑ مﻮﻘﻧ  ﻞﻤﻌﻟا قﻮ���ﺳ عﺎ���ﺿوأ ﻰﻠﻋ ﺔﯾﺮ���ﺼﻤﻟا تﺎﺟﺎﺠﺘﺣﻻاﻲﻓ  مﺎﻋ 2011  ةأﺮﻤﻠﻟ ﺔﺒ���ﺴﻨﻟﺎﺑﺑماﺪﺨﺘ���ﺳﺎ  تﺎﻧﺎﯿﺑ
 ﻰﻌﺒﺘﺘﻟا ﺢ��ﺴﻤﻟاﻟﻞﻤﻌﻟا قﻮ��ﺴ ﻰﻓ ) ﺮ��ﺼﻣELMPS تﺎﺟﺎﺠﺘﺣﻻا ةﺪ��ﺷ ﻦﻣ ﺎﻨﯾﺪﻟ سﺎﯿﻘﻣ ءﺎﻨﺒﺑ مﻮﻘﻧ .(-  دﺪﻋ "ءاﺪﮭ��ﺸﻟا"  ىﻮﺘ��ﺴﻣ ﻰﻠﻋ ﻞﻛ
ﺔﻈﻓﺎﺤﻣ  (تﺎﺟﺎﺠﺘﺣﻻا لﻼﺧ ﻢﮭﻔﺘﺣ اﻮﻘﻟ ﻦﯾﺬﻟا ﻦﯾﺮھﺎﻈﺘﻤﻟا يأ)-  ةرﻮﺜﻠﻟ ﺔﯿﺋﺎ������ﺼﺣﻹا تﺎﻧﺎﯿﺒﻟا ةﺪﻋﺎﻗ ﻦﻣ ةﺪﯾﺮﻓ تﺎﻣﻮﻠﻌﻣ ماﺪﺨﺘ������ﺳﺎﺑ
 نأ ﺪﺠﻧ .ﺔﯾﺮﺼﻤﻟا  تﺎﺟﺎﺠﺘﺣا 2011  رﺎﺸﻤﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻦﯿﺴﻨﺠﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ ةﻮﺠﻔﻟا ﺖﻀﻔﺧ ءﺎﺴﻨﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ ﺔﻟﺎﻄﺒﻟا ةدﺎﯾز ﻖﯾﺮط ﻦﻋ ﺔﻠﻣﺎﻌﻟا ىﻮﻘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺔﻛ
 ﻲ��ﺳﺎﯿ��ﺴﻟا ﺮﯿﯿﻐﺘﻟاو .صﺎﺨﻟا عﺎﻄﻘﻟا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟاوﻗﺮﺛأ ﺪ  ﺐﻟﺎﻐﻟا ﻲﻓﻲﻓ ﻟا ﻲﻓ ﺮ��ﺳﻷا ﻲﻓ ﻞﻤﻌﻟا قﻮ��ﺳ ﻲﻓ ةأﺮﻤﻠﻟ ﺔﯿﺒ��ﺴﻨﻟا ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﺗ ﻞﺧﺪﻟا ﻊﯾزﻮ
 .ةرﻮﺜﻟا ﻞﺒﻗﻧمﻮﻘ ﺑ ﺞﺋﺎﺘﻨﻟا هﺬھ ﻂﺑﺮﻣﻊ  بدﻷاﻟﻦﻜﻤﯾ ﻒﯿﻛ ﻦﯿﺒﺘ نﻮﻜﯾ نأ  ﺔﻣﺪﺼﻟﺷﮫﮭﯿﺒ ﺗﻰﻠﻋ ﺮﯿﺛﺄ ا ﻢﯿﺴﻘﺗأﺮﻤﻟا ﻦﯿﺑ ﻞﻤﻌﻟﻞﺟﺮﻟاو ة ىﺬﻟاو 





Women’s empowerment has been a central issue in the policy and academic debates in recent 
years. There is now a large consensus that empowering women may benefit economic 
development and is highly desirable for efficiency (see, for instance, United Nations, 2005; 
Duflo, 2012; Diebolt and Perrin, 2013). In the academic literature, a growing number of 
randomized experiments shed light on the effects of programs that aim at improving the status 
of women in several domains (see Beaman, Duflo, Pande and Topalova, 2012; Jensen, 2012; 
Beath, Christia and Enikopolov, 2013; Bandiera, Buehren, Burgess, Goldstein, Gulesci, Rasul 
and Sulaiman, 2014; Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2014). 
Still, in many countries in the world, women lag behind men in several education and labor 
market outcomes. This is particularly true in the Arab World, where several countries are also 
experiencing, in recent years, a wave of protests and revolutions - known as the “Arab Spring” 
- mainly driven by poor labor market prospects for educated youth (Campante and Chor, 
2012a). In this paper, we focus on Egypt, where former presidents Hosni Mubarak and 
Mohamed Morsi were removed from power in February 2011 and July 2013, respectively. 
Egypt is also a country with large gender segregation. The United Nations (2013) documents 
that it is ranked 77 out of 80 countries on the Gender Empowerment Measure and according to 
the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report (2013), 125 among 136 countries. In 
the 1990s, following the implementation of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program, Egypt experienced growing gender gaps, partly because of the contraction of 
opportunities in the public sector, without an increase in available jobs in the non-governmental 
sectors (Assaad and Arntz, 2005).  
In this paper, we provide an empirical analysis of how the important and recent political 
changes in the Arab World are shaping the gender gap in labor market outcomes. To construct 
a measure of intensity of the Egyptian protests, we exploit unique information on the number 
of demonstrators who died during the protests, denoted as “martyrs” in our data source 
(Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution)1. We also use information on labor market 
outcomes before and during the political unrest, from two waves (2006 and 2012) of the Egypt 
Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS). The panel structure of the data allows us to condition 
on unobserved heterogeneity. 
Why do we expect the Arab Spring to change the relative position of women in the labor 
market? There are several potential mechanisms through which the Egyptian protests may 
affect women’s labor market conditions. A first channel – which is the most plausible – is 
related to the idea that political instability may negatively affect growth (see Alesina, Özler, 
Roubini and Swagel, 1996). If political turnover represents at least in the short run a negative 
income shock, then for households that are close to the subsistence level, the negative shock 
would probably undermine the importance of cultural factors and attitudes towards female 
work (i.e., in periods of recession, the work of women might be encouraged if the households 
are close to the subsistence level, even if in normal economic conditions the labor market is 
highly segregated by gender). This is also in line with work of Attanasio, Low and Sánchez-
Marcos (2005), who explore the role of female labor supply as an insurance mechanism against 
idiosyncratic earnings risk within the family. Were the households close to the subsistence level 
before the beginning of the political unrest? Campante and Chor (2012a) present the results of 
a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute in Egypt shortly after the resignation 
of Hosni Mubarak: 64 percent of respondents who claimed that they had taken part in the recent 
protests cited “low living standards/lack of jobs” as their main motivation and 41 percent of 
the respondents answered that they had “trouble feeding [themselves] and [their] family and 
1 See also the international press, for instance New York Times (2011), BBC News (2012) and Al Jazeera (2013). 
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buying even the most essential things for survival” (see International Republican Institute, 2011 
and Campante and Chor, 2012a for more results of this poll). 
A second channel relates to one of the main determinants of the protests: the increase in the 
unemployment of educated youth (see Campante and Chor, 2012a), which may imply a change 
in the importance of human capital in the economy. Related to this point, Doepke and Tertilt 
(2009) show that theoretically, when the importance of human capital in the economy increases 
– for instance as a consequence of technological progress -, men might be willing to give more 
rights to women to ensure that their children’s level of education is higher. In the context of 
the Arab World - which is very different from the context that motivates the analysis of Doepke 
and Tertilt (2009) - there is evidence of a deterioration of the importance of human capital and, 
for Egypt, a decline in social mobility among educated youth, which started in the mid-1980s 
and is linked to a contraction in public sector employment (Binzel and Carvalho, 2013). This 
decrease in the importance of human capital might imply a larger gender gap if men consider 
their children’s level of schooling less relevant and are consequently less likely to support 
women’s empowerment.  
A third channel might go through migration. Herbst (1990) highlights how in most areas in 
Africa, in the beginning of the 20th century, migration was the easiest option to express 
discontent with deteriorating economic and political conditions. Migration might influence the 
relative position of women in the labor market, for several reasons: having a household member 
who resides in another country is associated with changes in the household size (Gibson, 
McKenzie and Stillman, 2011), in the relative number of women and men within a household, 
in foregone earnings of the family members who emigrated, and in the amount of remittances 
received by the members who are left behind (Sjaastad, 1962). There is literature showing a 
negative effect of male migration on labor force participation of women left behind (see 
Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009, among others). 
A fourth channel goes through fertility behavior. The Egyptian protests may be an important 
source of uncertainty, and this uncertainty can affect the choice of whether or not to have a 
child (see Adsera, 2004, for a discussion on fertility choices and general uncertainty). Given 
that labor market and fertility choices are jointly determined, the uprisings could theoretically 
impact female labor market conditions through this channel. 
A fifth channel concerns the possibility that in periods of recession, firms prefer to hire workers 
who are relatively less expensive, for instance women and minority groups (see, among others, 
Rubery, 1988). If this positive discrimination towards women was the main channel driving 
the relationship of interest, then this reason would predict a reduction in the gender gap in 
employment following a period of uprisings and political instability. 
A sixth channel may refer to time constraints. If men are more likely than women to participate 
in protests, then we expect this participation to negatively affect the time they can allocate to 
work. This is another mechanism that may increase the labor force participation of women 
relative to men. 
Finally, political unrest might change women’s labor supply through changes in religious 
participation. For instance, Binzel and Carvalho (2013) present religion theoretically as a 
coping mechanism for unfulfilled aspirations and show how an unexpected decline in social 
mobility combined with inequality can produce a religious revival led by the educated middle 
class. Using data on the 1997 and 1998 Indonesian financial crisis, Chen (2010) demonstrates 
a causal effect of economic distress on religious intensity, measured using information on 
Koran study and Islamic school attendance. Chaney (2013) uses centuries of Nile flood data 
and shows an increase in the political power of religious leaders during periods of economic 
downturn. These three works thus confirm that political unrest and the business cycle may 
affect religious participation, which in turn can influence women’s labor supply. This is in line 
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with the literature showing the relationship between religion and religious rules, on the one 
hand, and gender inequalities in several outcomes of interest, on the other hand (see Becker 
and Woessmann, 2008; Meyersson, 2014; Noury and Speciale, 2014). 
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on female labor force participation that documents 
significant persistence over time of women’s labor supply. This inertia may depend on the 
nature of cultural beliefs and on historical determinants of social norms (see for instance, 
Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn, 2013). Despite this persistence, women’s labor supply can react 
to technological, economic, demographic and political shocks: see Goldin and Katz (2002), 
Albanesi and Olivetti (2015) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) for an analysis 
of the consequences of technological and medical changes on female labor force participation; 
Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) and Ager, Brückner and Herz (2014) for the role of economic 
shocks; Teso (2014) and Grosjean and Khattar (2014) for the effects of demographic changes; 
Goldin (1991) and Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) for the role of World War II. From a 
conceptual point of view, in the presence of multiple labor market outcomes equilibria, these 
shocks may imply a shift from an equilibrium to another with a different level of women’s 
labor supply.  
We complement this literature by analyzing the effect of a recent and very relevant political 
shock, the Arab Spring protests, on the relative position of women in the labor market. While 
the available data on Egypt allows us to analyze the short-term labor market impacts only, the 
literature we cite above suggests how a relevant shock to the labor division between men and 
women may have long run consequences as cultural norms about the appropriate role of women 
vary. Related to this point, Goldin and Olivetti (2013) show that the shock associated to World 
War II had a persistent impact on labor market outcomes of higher educated women in the US. 
These findings are also consistent with a dynamic pattern proposed theoretically by Hazan and 
Maoz (2002).  In their model, a woman’s employment outside her home may initially have a 
direct negative effect on her household’s utility, but an increase in women’s labor force 
participation in a certain period decreases the utility loss for women who work outside the 
household in the following period. This brings a virtuous cycle of increases in women’s labor 
force participation. 
Our work also contributes to a growing literature on protests (see, among others, Kuran, 1989; 
Collins and Margo, 2007; Fearon, 2011; Campante and Chor, 2012a; Chaney, 2012; Madestam, 
Shoag, Veuger, and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2013; Campante and Chor, 2014; Kent and Phan, 2014; 
Aidt and Franck, 2015). Using data on the Arab Spring in Egypt, Acemoglu, Hassan and 
Tahoun (2014) investigate the effects of the recent protests on stock market returns, for firms 
connected to three groups: elites associated with Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), 
the military, and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. They construct a daily estimate of the 
number of protesters in Tahrir Square as measure of revolution intensity, using information 
from Egyptian and international print and online media. With respect to this paper, our work 
differs in the outcome of interest (female labor market outcomes rather than firms’ stock market 
returns) and in the way to construct the intensity of the protests. Our measure of intensity of 
the uprisings varies at the geographical level, while Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2014) 
focus on events in one location (Tahrir Square), exploiting variation at the daily level. 
Our empirical strategy combines a Difference-in-Differences specification to an Instrumental 
Variable approach. We have information both before and after the uprisings, and exploit 
geographical differences in the protest intensity. To mitigate the potential endogeneity of our 
main explanatory variable, we use the distance to Cairo, Egypt’s capital, as an instrument for 
the number of “martyrs” during the protests. We borrow this instrumental variable from the 
literature on civil conflicts (see, among others, Voors, Nillesen, Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink and 
Van Soest, 2012). Our first stage regressions – which show that our instrument is strongly 
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negatively correlated with the intensity of the protests – add to a growing literature recognizing 
that political participation is spatially or geographically clustered (Mutz, 2002; McClurg, 2003; 
Cho and Rudolph, 2008). Our identifying assumption is that the distance to the capital does not 
explain labor market outcomes after we condition on several other mechanisms different from 
the protests: the governorate-level share of public sector employment, number of police 
stations, average level of education, a dummy variable for fully urban governorates, GDP per 
capita and population density. The advantage of combining an Instrumental Variable approach 
with the Difference-in-Differences methodology is that our estimates remain unbiased in case 
of omission of differences that remain the same over time, across governorates with different 
levels of protest intensity.  
Our estimates show that women’s labor force participation in the aftermath of the 2011 
Egyptian protests has increased, especially for those households belonging to the lowest two 
quartiles of the pre-revolution distribution of income per capita. This increase in labor force 
participation is mainly explained by an increase in women’s unemployment and private sector 
employment. Our results suggest that the recent waves of protests have reduced the number of 
weekly working hours for men and increased the volatility of their income. These findings may 
be compatible with a framework of intra-household risk sharing where women tend to increase 
their labor force participation to face the increased risk and instability of men’s income flows.  
We also find a reduction in migration in the aftermath of the revolution. Even if this may be 
compatible with an increase in labor force participation for women left behind, the magnitude 
of this effect is not large enough to justify the size of the adjustment in labor market outcomes. 
Instead we do not find statistically significant evidence for the other mechanisms: remittance 
transfers, fertility decisions, schooling decisions for children and religious education. Our 
analysis also suggests that neither discrimination nor time constraints are driving the 
relationship of interest.    
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents information on the Egyptian 
revolution and “martyrs.” Section 3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 describes the 
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results and discusses the mechanisms. Section 6 
provides some robustness checks. Section 7 briefly concludes. 
2. Background Information: The Egyptian Revolution and the “Martyrs” 
The first wave of the Egyptian revolution began on the 25th of January 2011. Youth activists, 
workers and football fans rallied against Mubarak’s government, participating in a protest that 
represents one of the biggest revolutionary movements in recent years (The Guardian, 2011). 
The Egyptian revolution was a people-led political mobilization, positioned among a series of 
Arab Spring uprisings that started in Tunisia and rapidly spread to the Middle East. Protests in 
Egypt unfolded in the country’s two major cities - Cairo and Alexandria - with millions rushing 
to the streets a few days after the first protest (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur, 2012). Crowds 
filled Tahrir, or Liberation, Square, and spilled into nearby streets. Protestors also came from 
rural provinces in the Nile Delta (CNN, 2011). 
Demonstrators were taking to the streets in several countries in the Arab World to protest 
against their respective authoritarian regimes. After few weeks of mass demonstrations, Ben 
Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt were forced to resign, putting an end to two longstanding 
autocratic regimes in the region. Inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, several Arab 
countries - Jordan, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia - 
witnessed similar revolutionary movements with varying levels of intensity (Beissinger, Jamal, 
and Mazur, 2012; Moaddel, 2012). 
Egyptian protestors tended to be overwhelming male, middle class, with above average 
educational levels, drawn from middle occupational and income profiles, and heavily 
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networked. More precisely, according to the Arab Barometer Study conducted in Egypt in July 
2011, 77% of demonstrators were male, 46% had the highest level of education (university and 
above) and 49% were internet users as opposed to only 18% for the population as a whole. 
These revolutionaries were motivated primarily by economic reasons and to a lesser extent by 
political and civil freedoms (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur, 2012).  
The spark that ignited the Egyptian revolution was mainly the death of a 28 years old man, 
called Khalid Said, who died after an encounter with the Egyptian police in Alexandria (New 
York Times, 2010). Shortly after his death, his story was spread all over blogs, websites and 
social media, evidencing the major role played by internet as a medium of communication and 
coordination tool used by protestors during the revolution (Beissinger, Jamal, and Mazur, 2012; 
Moaddel, 2012). The public protests started in the aftermath of Khalid Said’s murder in Egypt’s 
streets, where people were holding posters and banners with his photographs. These events 
built up to trigger the Egyptian revolution in January 2011 (Buckner and Khatib, 2014). 
Many more Egyptian demonstrators died during the protests. These “martyrs” – a term used in 
the international press (see, for instance, New York Times, 2011, BBC News, 2012 and Al 
Jazeera, 2013) and in our data source – played a central role and were an indisputable catalyst 
in the onset of the Egyptian revolution, invoking moral outrage and creating a self-fulfilling 
movement of mobilization against the government. This is similar to what happened in Tunisia 
and Syria, with Mohamed Bouazizi and Hamza Al-Khatib being examples of demonstrators 
who died during the protests, and whose deaths became a catalyst for the revolution in their 
countries (Buckner and Khatib, 2014). 
This portrayal of the “martyrs” in the Arab Spring uprisings is very different from the standard 
definition of martyrs who self-sacrifice themselves for their religious beliefs and faith. As 
Buckner and Khatib (2014) argument, in the context of the Arab Spring the term “martyr” has 
been attached to those who died at the hands of their own states in pursuit of political change. 
In the immediate aftermath of Mubarak’s resignation, as the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF) took power in Egypt, a constitutional review committee was formed to 
formulate new amendments to the Constitution. The constitutional declaration of 2011 was 
approved on March 19 by referendum (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The transitional context 
dictated these new amendments: a term limit for future presidents, the separation of powers 
and a call for judicial oversight of elections, stood as paramount. Under the transitional 
government, the issue of women’s rights was not a priority (Human Rights Watch, 2011; 
Gόmez-Rivas, 2011). Women were officially excluded from the official committee proposing 
the amendments to the Constitution and their political representation in the aftermath of the 
revolution also remained very low (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The Provisional Constitution 
adopted in March 2011 governed Egypt until the adoption of a new Constitution in December 
2012, under President Mohamed Morsi’s rule. 
2.1 Stylized facts on the intensity of the revolution 
Protestors engaging in a revolutionary movement are not only committed in terms of time and 
resources, but they also acknowledge the probability of occurrence of certain risks, including 
arrest, injury or even death (Moaddel, 2012). Hence, the number of “martyrs” (i.e., 
demonstrators who died during the protests), using the terminology in our data source - 
represents a central measure of the intensity of the protests and is quite correlated with a number 
of other indicators of the revolution.  
Figure 1 displays the number of “martyrs” and injured from February 2011, after Mubarak 
stepped down and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power in Egypt in 
the name of the military on the 11th of February 2011, till June 2013, the end of former president 
Mohamed Morsi’s one year rule. The number of arrested is also displayed during Mohamed 
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Morsi’s rule, from July 2012 till June 2013. As shown, these measures of the intensity of the 
violent protests are closely correlated and follow the same patterns. The first sharp trend shift 
in November 2011 corresponds to Mohamed Mahmoud Street’s deadly clashes, which lasted 
five days,  from the 19th of November to the 24th of November. It was a street massacre that 
broke out between protesters and Central Security Forces (CSF), as protests took place in 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street in response to a CSF’s attack on a sit-in in Tahrir Square. The CSF 
dispersed demonstrators using birdshot, tear gas, rubber and live bullets. A concrete wall was 
installed in the street to prevent the protesters from reaching the Ministry of Interior building 
(Le Monde, 2011). The second sharp shift in February 2012 corresponds to a street battle 
between protesters and the police, near Egypt’s Ministry of Interior, triggered by the deaths in 
Port Said Stadium riot, the country’s worst soccer disaster. Demonstrators were condemning 
the death of soccer fans at the Port Said Stadium and were holding the military-led authorities 
accountable for the deaths (The Guardian, 2012). The trend shifts in November 2012 and 
January 2013 correspond to clashes between civilians and the police in the anniversaries of 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street’s massacre and the 25th of January revolution, respectively.  
Figures 2, 3 and 4, display the geographical distribution of the “martyrs” from January 2011 to 
June 2012, the injured from February 2011 to June 2012 and the arrested from July 2013 to 
May 20142. Cairo - in particular Tahrir Square - was the main center of mobilization of 
demonstrators and protesters during the first 18 days of the revolution and the second wave of 
the revolution. The figures show a greater number of “martyrs,” injured and arrested in Cairo 
and its neighboring governorates. Our identification strategy is partly based on this stylized 
fact, as we discuss in Section 4.2. 
3. Data  
The empirical analysis relies on data from the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS), a 
nationally representative panel survey. The ELMPS, as a typical labor force survey, covers 
topics such as employment, unemployment and earnings. Additionally, it provides very rich 
information on job dynamics, saving and borrowing behavior, migration, remittance-
recipiency, parental background, education, entrepreneurial activities, fertility choices, 
women’s status and decision-making (Assaad and Krafft, 2013).  
The ELMPS is carried out by the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with 
Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) since 1998. It has 
been administered to nationally representative samples in 1998, 2006 and 20123. We take 
advantage of an important feature of the ELMPS, the fact of being carried out before and after 
the 2011 Egyptian protests. At the time of this writing, there is no available information on 
labor market outcomes after the revolution for the other countries that participated to the Arab 
Spring. We use the panel dimension and mainly focus on the 2006 and 2012 rounds, allowing 
us to observe individuals’ labor market outcomes before and after the uprisings, as the 
fieldwork of the 2012 round took place from March 1, 2012 to June 10, 2012, more than a year 
after the protests. Of the 37,140 individuals interviewed in 2006, 28,679 individuals were 
successfully re-interviewed in 2012. We particularly focus on working-age individuals in the 
two-rounds, aged 15 to 64 years old.4 Descriptive statistics on individuals’ and households’ pre 
and post revolution characteristics are reported in Table 1. 
2 Online Appendix Table 9 presents the number of “martyrs” for the first eighteen days of the protests and for the subsequent 
period - from the 12th of February 2011 till the end of June 2012. 
3 See Assaad and Barsoum (2000), Assaad (2002), Barsoum (2009) and Assaad (2009) for additional information on the survey. 
4 Individuals included in the estimation sample are at least aged 15 years old in 2006 and at most aged 64 years old in 2012. 
In the Online Appendix Table 16, we present a robustness check where we consider an estimation sample of prime-aged 
individuals (individuals aged at least 21 years old in 2006 to 64 years old in 2012). 
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Given that we are matching households and individuals across survey rounds, two types of 
attrition can potentially arise: the first one is linked to the inability to track an entire household 
interviewed in 2006 while the second one is linked to the inability to track a split household 
(one or more individuals who left their original household either alone or with additional 
individuals who may have joined them later), when the original household can be tracked. 
Type-1 attrition rates are 17.3% at the household level and 14.2% at the individual level, while 
type-2 attrition rate is 30.3%. To correct for the possible biases that could result from these two 
types of attrition, we use panel weights between 2006 and 20125.  
One of the main novelties of this paper is the use of a unique dataset that to our knowledge has 
not been exploited in economic research yet: the Statistical Database of the Egyptian 
Revolution, administered by the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights6. This dataset 
documents all the events, including fatalities, injuries, arrests and prosecutions during the 
period of the Egyptian revolution as a result of political and social changes. The data is 
collected during the first eighteen days of the protests (from the 25th of January 2011 to the 11th 
of February 2011), during the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) (from 
the 11th of February 2011 to June 2012), during former president Mohamed Morsi’s rule (from 
July 2012 till June 2013) and, lastly, most recent data cover the period from July 2013 to May 
2014. These individual level data were collected on a daily basis. They document the names of 
the “martyrs,” the injured and the arrested; their place of residence, occupation, marital status, 
date of birth; the type of incident leading to the death, injury or arrest; the governorate where 
the incident took place, as well as other relevant data for documentation purposes (see Online 
Appendix Figure 1 for a screenshot of these data). 
Descriptive statistics for all outcome variables are provided for the estimation sample and by 
gender in Table 2. One important aspect is that female labor force participation is low in Egypt, 
around 30% in 2006 for the working-age women in our sample. This reflects the fact that even 
though women have become much more educated over the past decades, relatively few engage 
in any kind of market work. In addition, the descriptive statistics show higher incidence of 
unemployment and non-wage work in 2006 among females compared to males. To a large 
extent, this segregation of the labor market by gender was due to the decline in government 
sector employment over the past two decades (Assaad and Barsoum, 2009). In line with the 
shrinking of the public sector, in 2006, women engage more in private sector employment 
compared to the public sector. Interestingly, women in our sample work in both formal and 
informal sectors, with similar incidences. By contrast, men seem to undertake more jobs in the 
informal sector compared to the formal sector. In terms of weekly working hours, conditional 
on being employed, Table 2 shows greater labor supply for men compared to women. However, 
it seems that between the two rounds of the survey, women who are employed tend to increase 
their labor supply, while men decrease the hours of work per week. 
4. Empirics  
4.1 Empirical strategy and regression specification 
We investigate the impact of the 2011 protests on the relative position of women in the labor 
market by estimating the following Difference-in-Differences specification, where we allow 
gender to be an important dimension of heterogeneity of the treatment effect7: 
5 See Assad and Krafft (2013) for a detailed discussion on sample attrition and the construction of the panel weights. 
6 The Center for Economic and Social Rights is a non-governmental organization that carries out research and advocacy 
projects on economic, social and cultural rights in several countries in the world, in collaboration with local human rights 
advocates and activists. It develops methodologies for measuring and monitoring economic and social rights compliance. 
7 We do not denote Equation 1 as a Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences specification, because we expect the protests to 
affect the labor market outcomes of men as well. 
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =   𝛼𝛼1 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 2012𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖   + 𝛼𝛼2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 2012𝑖𝑖+ 𝛼𝛼3𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼42012𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝜶𝜶𝟓𝟓𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖+ 2012𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
martyrs - our treatment variable - is a measure of the intensity of the protests: the governorate-
level number of “martyrs” from January 2011 to June 2012; 2012 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 in 2012 (after the beginning of the protests), and 0 in 2006 (before the protests). To answer 
our research question, we compare outcomes of women with those of men, by including 
interaction terms with the female dummy variable. 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖,  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and 2012𝑖𝑖  are respectively 
individual, district and year fixed effects. The two first fixed effects absorb the non-interacted 
terms female and martyrs.  
The vector X contains individual and household variables8. Individual controls include a 
dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary 
and preparatory education, secondary education either general or vocational and above 
secondary education, either post-secondary institute or university education and above. The 
reference category is no-educational degree either illiterate or literate without any diploma. 
Household controls include a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed households, a dummy 
variable for land ownership, household size, number of adults who are 15-64 years old, an 
indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the 
household’s educational attainment. 
The coefficient of interest is the parameter 𝛼𝛼1: it allows identifying the differential effect of the 
protests by gender (i.e., how the Arab Spring in Egypt affects the gender gap for several 
outcomes of interest. 𝛼𝛼2 quantifies the effect of the protests on men’s labor market outcomes, 
while 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 represents the effect on women’s outcomes.  
For each individual in the sample, we have information for two time periods, t=2006 and 2012. 
Taking the first difference of both left and right-hand side, we can transform Equation 1 as 
follows9: 
∆𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖   + 𝛼𝛼2𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝜶𝜶𝟓𝟓∆𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊+𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
The dependent variable in Equation 2 represents the change in an outcome of interest between 
2012 and 2006. Similarly to Equation 1, the specification in Equation 2 allows to control for 
all time-invariant individual characteristics. While estimating the latter equation it is not 
possible to identify the coefficient 𝛼𝛼3, we can still estimate the coefficient of interest - 𝛼𝛼1 - 
which is the parameter associated to the variable 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 2012𝑖𝑖  𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in Equation 1 
and to 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 in Equation 2. 𝛽𝛽0 is the constant term: it accounts for the average 
change in outcomes between the two waves of the survey across all individuals in the sample. 
Including 𝛽𝛽0 is the equivalent of adding a year fixed effect in a regression where the dependent 
variables are expressed in levels10.  
A potential threat to our identification strategy is that governorates exposed to a higher intensity 
of the protests may be on different economic trends, and hence would exhibit differential 
changes in labor market outcomes even in the absence of the uprisings. Online Appendix Table 
8 See Yang (2008) for an example of work that estimates, among other outcomes, labor supply equations conditioning on a 
similar set of variables. For sake of brevity, in the notation of Equations 1 and 2 we only include individual controls (𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖), while 
in the regressions we also condition on household controls (𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗) and pre-revolution governorate characteristics. 
9 The advantage of estimating Equation 2 is that it allows identifying the coefficient of interest 𝛼𝛼1, with a more parsimonious 
specification for the IV regressions, with two endogenous regressors rather than three. The Online Appendix Table 10 shows 
that results are similar when we estimate Equation 1 using OLS specification, for labor force participation, unemployment and 
employment. Because the time periods are 2 (2006 and 2012), the first-difference transformation does not create issues of 
serial correlation of the error term. 
10 In Equation 1, the year fixed effect is 2012. 
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1 presents Egyptian governorates’ characteristics by the intensity of the revolution. We check 
whether governorates with an above median number of “martyrs” differ along a number of pre-
revolution characteristics from governorates with a below median number of “martyrs.” 
Governorates exposed to a higher intensity of protests have a higher share of public sector 
employment and are more likely to be urban, compared to governorates exposed to a lower 
intensity of protests. Apart from these two characteristics, the two groups do not have any 
significant differences along the other dimensions such as population density, real GDP per 
capita, the average number of years of schooling for the youth population and the number of 
police stations. In the regression analysis, we take into account these potential differences in 
governorates’ characteristics by conditioning on these pre-revolution governorate controls11. 
More importantly, in Section 6 we present placebo estimations of Equation 2 as falsification 
test. 
4.1 IV approach 
Our empirical strategy (see Equation 1 and its first-differenced equivalent Equation 2) relies 
on Difference-in-Differences estimation, which we combine to an Instrumental Variable 
approach. The specification allows for heterogeneity of the treatment effects by gender. There 
are several reasons why in Equation 2 the intensity of the protests (and the interaction term 
martyrs x female as well) is endogenous. First, the number of “martyrs” might provide a 
measure with error of the intensity of the uprisings, implying attenuation bias for the estimated 
coefficient of interest 𝛼𝛼1. Second, unobserved time-varying labor market shocks at the 
governorate-level might influence simultaneously individual labor market outcomes and the 
intensity of the protests, which was mainly driven by poor labor market prospects for the 
educated youth (Campante and Chor, 2012a). As a consequence of these time-varying and 
asymmetric economic shocks, governorates exposed to a higher intensity of the protests may 
be on different economic trends, and hence would exhibit differential changes in labor market 
outcomes even in the absence of the 2011 Egyptian uprisings. 
To mitigate the potential endogeneity of the “intensity of the protests” variable, we use the 
distance to Cairo as an instrument for the number of “martyrs” during the protests. We borrow 
this instrumental variable from the literature on civil conflicts (see among others Voors, 
Nillesen, Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink and Van Soest, 2012). More precisely, we interact the 
distance to the capital with the female dummy variable, and use distance to Cairo and the 
interaction term distance to Cairo x female as instruments for martyrs and martyrs x female in 
Equation 212. Cairo, and in particular its well-known Tahrir Square, was the main center of 
mobilization of demonstrators and protesters during the revolution. The closer to the capital, 
the greater was the mobilization and the higher was the probability of participation in 
demonstrations.  
Apart from the role of individual-level characteristics, such as education, income, gender and 
civic associations’ engagement (see Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Campante and Chor, 
2012b), a growing literature recognizes that political participation is spatially or geographically 
clustered (Mutz, 2002; McClurg, 2003; Cho and Rudolph, 2008). Individuals are more likely 
to participate in political activities if people around them are likely to participate. The literature 
11 The inclusion of pre-treatment controls is a standard approach in the estimation of Difference-in-Differences specifications 
(see for instance Yang, 2008). In Online Appendix Table 2, we present coefficient estimates from a regression of the 
governorate level number of “martyrs” on a set of pre-revolution governorate characteristics. No coefficient is statistically 
different from zero. This suggests that governorates exposed to different intensities of the protests do not significantly differ 
from each other, along a set of pre-revolution governorate characteristics.  
12 The outcomes of interest are either categorical or continuous variables. Some dependent variables take the values -1, 0, 1, 
from first differencing dummy variables like labor force participation, employment and unemployment. For these categorical 
variables, we have also tried to estimate Equation (2) using IV Ordered Probit model by fitting an observed recursive mixed 
process model (using the cmp command in STATA, which was developed by Roodman, 2011). Results from this check are 
consistent with the 2SLS estimates (see Online Appendix Table 11). 
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provides various explanations and channels underlying these effects but, despite the growing 
recognition of the hypothesis of spatial clustering, lacks consensus regarding the specific 
mechanism operating. Cho and Rudolph (2008) suggest four alternative theoretical 
mechanisms to explain the geographical clustering of political participation: self-selection, 
elite-driven processes, social interaction and casual observation. The first channel relates to the 
fact that people make residential choices based on individual-level criteria. Because similar 
like-minded individuals choose to live next to each other, the spatial clustering of political 
participation may be a result of selection. The second mechanism suggests that political elites 
target certain geographical regions to mobilize the mass. Accordingly, elite-driven 
mobilization processes can explain the observed spatial patterns. The third channel operates 
through social interactions. Individuals value political information that they seem to acquire 
through social networks and interactions within their social environment. Thus, as this social 
learning process diffuses, similar patterns of political engagement arise within an individual’s 
social environment. The last mechanism operates through casual observation. According to 
Cho and Rudolph (2008), individuals detect signals about the prevailing norms and political 
preferences of the local community by observation. Consequently, spatial proximity may shape 
their political participation through this channel, even if all the contextual effects are controlled 
for.  
Following these works, the distance to the capital Cairo is meant to capture the 
geographical/spatial clustering in political participation. Our identification strategy therefore 
relies on a theory of diffusion or contagion that begins at a core and spreads to neighboring 
areas. This approach perfectly fits the participation patterns of the demonstrations observed 
during the Egyptian revolution. Protests starting at a core, the capital Cairo, unfold and 
propagate gradually to the other governorates. 
To provide additional evidence on the reason why our instrumental variable is correlated with 
the endogenous regressor, in Figure 5 we present a two-way scatter plot between the 
participation rates in the second round of the Presidential elections of June 2012 and the 
distance to the capital Cairo. The participation rates in the presidential elections are negatively 
correlated with the distance to Cairo. Similarly, our instrumental variable is negatively 
correlated with the political mobilization during the Arab Spring. Residents in Cairo and 
neighboring governorates are more likely to participate in the demonstrations and elections. 
For all IV specifications, we report the first stage Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics, which 
show that in all instrumental variables regressions our instruments are well correlated with the 
endogenous regressors. 
4.1.1 Discussion on the validity of the instrument 
Our identifying assumption is that distance to the capital does not explain labor market 
outcomes after controlling for several other mechanisms different from the protests. To ensure 
that the distance to the capital only affects labor market outcomes through its impact on the 
political shock (and therefore to ensure that the exclusion restriction holds), we condition on 
several pre-revolution (2006) governorate characteristics. For instance, a potential threat to the 
validity of our instrumental variable strategy is that most public employment opportunities are 
in (or close to) Cairo. This may represent a problem because in Egypt the contraction in public 
sector employment over the past two decades is associated with the decline in social mobility 
among educated Egyptian youth (Binzel and Carvalho, 2013), and therefore is a potential 
determinant of our main explanatory variable (i.e., political unrest). To avoid that our IV 
findings are simply driven by distance to the capital proxying public sector employment 
opportunities, in some specifications we condition on the share of public sector employment in 
2006 by governorate and its interaction term with the female dummy variable.    
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Another potential concern of the IV strategy is that the capital represents the area with the 
highest number of police stations. This implies a higher probability for a protester to have a 
clash with the police. Moreover, the police stations might be located in areas where public 
sector employment opportunities are relatively higher. As additional control, in some 
regressions we include the number of police stations at the governorate level per 10,000 
inhabitants and its interaction with female13.  
The capital might as well attract the educated youth. As Lipset (1959) advocates, education is 
a key determinant of democratic values. In this context, the most educated people are likely to 
be more concerned about politics, have greater capabilities to understand societal issues and 
hence, be more likely to participate in protest activism. According to Inglehart (1990), the 
youth tend to hold more modern, democratic and universal worldviews. Therefore we have 
checked the robustness of our results to the addition of the average level of education for 
individuals aged 15 to 30 years old, by governorate and for the year 2006 (i.e., before the 
revolution), and its interaction term with female. This is important because the average 
education level of young people might simultaneously affect the intensity of the protests – most 
of the protesters being young and relatively well educated – and individual labor market 
outcomes, through human capital externalities and the association between average education 
and returns to human capital. 
Distance to Cairo might as well capture the degree of centrality and closeness to the core of the 
Egyptian economy. This represents an additional potential threat to the validity of the 
instrumental variable because distance to the capital could therefore explain the overall labor 
market and population dynamics14. To address this potential issue, in some specifications we 
add as controls the log of GDP per capita in 2006, the total population density in 2006 and their 
interaction terms with female. 
In addition, distance to Cairo might encompass rural and urban dynamics. Living in urban areas 
promotes political participation as it captures access to more resources and information 
compared to remote or rural areas (Moaddel, 1993). Therefore, in some specifications we also 
include a fully urban governorate dummy and its interaction term with female. 
The inclusion of all the interaction terms we present above in this sub-section does not exclude, 
however, that other omitted factors can be correlated with both the intensity of the protests and 
labor market outcomes. The advantage of combining an Instrumental Variable approach with 
a Difference-in-Differences specification is that our estimates remain unbiased in case of 
omission of differences across governorates with different levels of protest intensity, provided 
that such differences remain the same over time. In Section 6, we present falsification tests 
confirming the validity of the parallel trends assumption, which is required for the Difference-
in-Differences methodology. 
4.1.2 First-stage regressions 
In Table 3, we report first stage regressions where we use the distance to Cairo (in hundreds of 
kilometers) and its interaction term with the female dummy to instrument the governorate level 
number of “martyrs” and its interaction term with the female dummy. In columns 1 and 2, we 
condition on individual and household characteristics, while in columns 3 and 4, we also 
include the pre-revolution governorate controls discussed earlier. As we might expect, the 
13 In Online Appendix Table 2, we find a negative correlation between the governorate level number of “martyrs” and the 
number of police stations per 10,000 inhabitants, even if this correlation is imprecisely estimated. This may suggest that the 
number of “martyrs” represents as well a proxy for the participation in demonstrations (the presence of police stations deterring 
the participation in protest activities) rather than just being a proxy for political repression. 
14 For instance, the distance to the capital might be correlated with social ties – people living in regions closer to Cairo being 
more likely to have closer social links to people in Cairo – and, through this channel, with regional economic development as 
well (see Burchardi and Hassan, 2013). 
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distance to Cairo is highly correlated with the intensity of the protests, proxied by the 
governorate level number of “martyrs.” The greater the distance to the capital, the less the 
number of “martyrs.” Relying on the estimated coefficient in column 3, when we condition on 
individual, household and pre-revolution governorate controls, we find that an increase in the 
distance to Cairo by 100 kilometers reduces the number of “martyrs” by about 27 people15.  
5. Results 
5.1 The impact of the Arab Spring protests on women’s labor market outcomes 
Table 4 presents estimates of the effect of the protests on women’s labor force participation, 
unemployment and employment. Our dependent variables are the changes in labor market 
outcomes between 2012 and 2006. We report both OLS and IV estimates, where we use the 
distance to the capital Cairo and its interaction term with the female dummy to instrument the 
governorate level number of “martyrs” and its interaction term with the female dummy. In 
some specifications, we only condition on individual and household controls. In other 
specifications, we also include the pre-revolution governorate controls discussed earlier16. The 
inclusion of pre-treatment control variables is a standard approach in the literature that 
estimates Difference-in-Differences equations. 
Our preferred specifications are the IV regressions where we condition on individual, 
household and pre-revolution governorate controls. The two estimated coefficients of interest 
are the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” and the female dummy (𝛼𝛼1 in 
Equation 2), and the number of “martyrs” (𝛼𝛼2 in Equation 2). The former coefficient captures 
the differential effect of the protests on labor market outcomes of women relative to men (i.e., 
how the protests affect the gender gap in labor force participation, employment and 
unemployment). The latter coefficient provides an estimate of the effect of the protests on 
men’s labor market outcomes. 
In the IV specifications, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the female 
dummy and the number of “martyrs” is always positive and statistically different from zero. 
This finding implies that the protests are reducing the gender gap in labor force participation. 
Relative to men, women have become more likely to participate in the Egyptian labor market 
because of the 2011 protests. To quantify the effect of the uprisings on women’s labor force 
participation, we sum the two estimated coefficients α1 and α2. If we consider a standard 
deviation (1.199) increase in the number of “martyrs,” the revolution increases women’s labor 
force participation by 13 percentage points (1.199*(-0.028+0.138), see column 4 of Table 4). 
This finding is interesting since women’s labor force participation in Egypt remains very low 
despite the substantial increase in their educational attainment (Binzel and Assaad, 2011). As 
Table 2 shows, women’s labor force participation is strikingly lower than their male peers’. 
Focusing on our estimation sample, in 2006 women’s labor force participation is only 29% as 
opposed to 81% for men’s labor force participation. Therefore, in percent terms, the impact of 
the Arab Spring protests on women’s labor force participation is large, about 45% (13/29) of 
the 2006 mean value of this labor market outcome. Also, our results show that a standard 
deviation increase in the intensity of the protests has reduced about 31% of the gender gap in 
labor force participation (16 over 52 percentage points, where in the computation of the effect 
we use 1.199*0.138 from column 4 of Table 4 and 0.52=0.811-0.293 from Table 2). 
It is interesting to analyze whether the relative increase in women’s labor force participation is 
due to a rise in employment or unemployment. We find that because of the protests, women’s 
unemployment and employment both increase (see the test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 in 
15 Both the distance to the capital Cairo and the governorate-level number of “martyrs” are multiplied by 100.  
16 In unreported regressions, we have included the pre-revolution governorate controls gradually, that is to each regression we 
have added each of these variables and their interaction terms with the female dummy one at a time. Results are qualitatively 
very similar. 
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columns 8 and 12 of Table 4). Considering a standard deviation change in the number of 
“martyrs,” the increases are about 5 and 8 percentage points, respectively (1.199*(α1+α2)).17 
The protests have encouraged women to engage in the Egyptian labor market by actively 
searching for employment, providing a leeway to increase women’s labor force participation, 
which has remained very low. 
To further investigate the role of the protests in explaining changes in labor market outcomes, 
we look at the effects on private and public sector employment. This analysis is particularly 
interesting because a distinctive divide between public and private sectors characterizes the 
Egyptian labor market (El-Haddad, 2009). For many years, the public sector dominated 
employment in Egypt and was particularly targeted by women because of the shorter working 
hours and the lower effort requirements, giving women the opportunity to take care of domestic 
chores and home responsibilities. Following the public sector downsizing that started in the 
1980s and the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program implemented in Egypt in 
1991, women witnessed a substantial reduction in the employment opportunities in the 
Egyptian labor market (Assaad and Arntz, 2005). Estimates in Table 5 show that a standard 
deviation increase in the intensity of the protests raises private sector employment of women 
by about 9 percentage points (1.199*(0.059+0.014)). This is a sizable effect, given that the pre-
revolution mean value of this variable was 0.134. However, the protests do not have a 
statistically significant effect on private sector employment of men and on public sector 
employment of both men and women. 
In Online Appendix Table 3, we investigate the heterogeneity of the effects of the Egyptian 
uprisings on individuals’ labor market outcomes, by sample distribution of pre-revolution per 
capita household income and individuals’ educational attainment. The estimates show an 
increase in labor force participation for women who belong to the two lowest quartiles of the 
sample distribution of pre-revolution per capita household income (Panel A) and for women 
with secondary education (Panel B).  In Online Appendix Table 4, we analyze the effects of 
the protests on labor market outcomes, by religious group. Results concerning Christian 
working aged individuals should be considered with caution because the sample size is small 
and for this estimation sample, the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. When we consider the subsample of Muslim individuals, an increase in the intensity 
of the protests raises women’s labor force participation, unemployment and employment. The 
increase in employment is larger than the increase in unemployment. 
5.2 Mechanisms 
To explore the mechanisms through which the protests affect labor market outcomes, we first 
investigate their effect on monthly wages, hourly wages and the number of weekly working 
hours, conditional on employment (Table 6). Our estimates show that a standard deviation 
increase in the intensity of the protests has reduced men’s weekly working hours by about 4 
hours (3.668*1.199). Instead, we do not find any statistically significant evidence of a negative 
effect of the 2011 protests on women’s remuneration or weekly working hours (see the 
statistical tests with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 in Table 6).  
To complement these findings, we have analyzed information from the 2012 wave of the 
ELMPS survey on whether individuals have witnessed any changes in employment conditions 
in the past three months due to the revolution. In line with our results, there are striking 
17 In Online Appendix Table 12, we have investigated the effect of the protests on a sample of couples only. To be included in 
the estimation sample of these regressions, the head of the household and his/her spouse need to be married in the two waves, 
2006 and 2012, and need to be in the working age category (15-64 years old). The results on this subsample are consistent 
with our findings on the sample of all working age men and women. The protests increase women’s participation by 11 
percentage points, unemployment by 4 percentage points and employment by 7 percentage points, when these effects are 
computed considering an increase in the number of “martyrs” by 1 standard deviation. The sum α1+α2 is statistically significant 
for the 3 outcomes. 
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differences when we compare the answers of men and women in our estimation sample: 55% 
of women report an improvement in working conditions compared to only 29% of men. In 
addition, in line with the findings presented earlier, 8% of men report a decrease in the number 
of working hours compared to only 1% of women, and 9% of men report a decrease in wages 
compared to 2% of women. Also, 16% of women report increases in pay or incentives as the 
change they witnessed in their job, while only 5% of men gave a similar answer. As Assaad 
and Krafft (2013) suggest, workers in the public sector were more likely to report 
improvements in working conditions, while workers in the private sector reported deterioration 
in working conditions18. The worsening of men’s working conditions during the protests 
therefore also depends on their higher probability to be employed in the private sector.  
We have also explored the role of income uncertainty (Table 7). Following Fuchs-Schündeln 
and Schündeln (2005), we use the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of monthly wage 
as a risk measure19. We construct the income uncertainty variable using three definitions: the 
first definition is based on occupation, the second on occupation and education groups, while 
for the third we use information on occupation and gender20. Our regression analysis shows 
that the protests raise the variance of monthly wages for employed men by 3 to 6 percent, when 
we compute these effects considering a standard deviation increase in the value of “martyrs” 
(0.029*1.199, 0.041*1.199 and 0.028*1.196, using the estimated coefficients reported in 
columns 2, 4 and 6, and which refer to α2 in Equation 2). Instead, the estimates show no 
negative effect on the variance of women’s monthly wages, as we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis that the sum α1+α2 of the coefficients in the IV specifications is statistically different 
from zero. These findings are in line with the descriptive information of Assaad and Krafft 
(2013), who show that men have been increasingly employed in riskier and marginal forms of 
employment in the period from 2006 to 2012 compared to the period from 1998 to 2006. This 
substantial rise in irregular wage work is closely associated with poverty and vulnerability. 
Overall, all these findings are compatible with a conceptual framework in which women are 
forced to participate in the labor market to compensate for falling male incomes or increased 
income uncertainty.21 This “added-worker effect” has been described in different contexts, see 
among others Lundberg (1985), Cullen and Gruber (2000), Hyslop (2001) and Stephens (2002). 
It is important to stress that women may react both to the expected and actual deterioration of 
their husband’s earnings. The reaction to the expected deterioration can be inferred from a 
general decrease in men’s wages, as the tables we describe above show. If many men witness 
a reduction in wages, then women may adjust their labor market decisions because of a 
reduction in their husbands’ expected earnings. To show the reaction to the actual deterioration 
in husbands’ labor market outcomes, we have analyzed the correlation between female labor 
force participation (dependent variable) and their husband’s wage and its variance. Online 
18 To check whether people’s perception matches the actual consequences of the revolution, Online Appendix Table 5 shows 
results from a regression in which the dependent variables are the same as in Table 6, and the main explanatory variable is an 
interaction term between the “martyrs” variable and a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is employed in the private sector. 
These regressions confirm a reduction in the number of hours worked per week for people working in the private sector (see 
test of statistical significance of the sum α1+α2). 
19 Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005) compute this risk measure - the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of income 
- for sixteen occupational and educational groups. They use three occupations (civil servants, white-collar workers and blue-
collar workers) and five education levels (college, vocational training, intermediate/technical schooling, secondary schooling, 
and secondary schooling not completed). Cappellari and Jenkins (2014) use longitudinal data to construct an alternative 
measure of earnings’ volatility, which is the standard deviation of the arc percentage change in earnings. Their approach is not 
adaptable in the case of two years panel data. 
20 Occupations are defined according to the ISCO-88 occupation classification (low-skilled blue collar, high-skilled blue collar, 
low skilled white collar and high-skilled white collar) for the longest job during past three months. Educational levels are the 
following: no educational degree, primary/preparatory education, secondary education and above secondary education. 
21 This channel is confirmed by the results in Online Appendix Table 3, showing that the revolution increases women’s labor 
force participation in households close to the subsistence level and that belong to the two lowest quartiles of the pre-revolution 
per capita household income distribution. 
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Appendix Table 6 presents OLS estimates where we condition on individual, household and 
pre-revolution governorate controls. While this table is merely descriptive, it remains 
informative if the assortative mating is positive (people marry with spouses having similar 
unobserved characteristics). This implies that the negative correlation coefficient on the 
husband’s wage variable represents an upper bound of the true effect, and that the non-
statistically significance of the correlation between women’s labor force participation and the 
variance of their husband’s wage may simply be due to an upward bias of the OLS estimates: 
if we observe positive assortative mating and a lower level of dispersion in wages for men with 
higher levels of unobserved ability - which is plausible if talented men have more stable 
occupations - then the bias of the OLS coefficient of the variance of husband’s wage is likely 
to be positive. 
We have checked whether alternative mechanisms can explain our main findings. Table 8 
presents results from OLS and IV regressions for the following outcomes at the household 
level: a dummy variable equal to 1 for households that report having a household member 
living or working abroad, log of remittances received, log of per capita household income 
(excluding remittances), log of per capita household income (including remittances), the ratio 
of pupils enrolled in religious (azhari) schools to the total number of individuals currently 
studying at the time of the survey (at the household level). Furthermore, we have investigated 
the effect of the protests on the probability of giving birth on a subsample of married women 
aged 18-49, nine months after the revolution compared to the same time interval before the 
2006 survey. In the introduction, we have provided the theoretical rationale for investigating 
the effects of political unrest on these additional variables. We only focus on households that 
did not split and have the same structure between 2006 and 2012, to have comparable figures 
for our dependent variables. 
Estimates in Table 8 show no effect of the protests on remittance-recipiency, household income 
(including or excluding remittances), religious education or women’s fertility22. The only 
statistically significant result is a slight reduction in migration in the aftermath of the 
revolution, by about 1 percentage point when considering an increase in the number of 
“martyrs” by one standard deviation.23 This finding is in line with information from the Arab 
Barometer Study, which was conducted in Egypt in July 2011: 89% of the Egyptians surveyed 
reported not considering migration, perhaps because of the optimistic expectations Egyptians 
had with respect to economic and political conditions. In principle, the reduction in migration 
we observe in Table 8 can increase women’s labor force participation, as shown empirically in 
several studies (see, among others, Lokshin and Glinskaya, 2009). However, even if the 
estimates are statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is not large enough to 
justify the size of the adjustment in women’s labor force participation that we observe in Table 
4. 
We have checked whether participation in protests reduces the time individuals can allocate to 
work. If men are more likely than women to participate in the demonstrations (as is the case, 
see Section 2), then this time constraint mechanism can generate a reduction in the gender gap 
in labor force participation. As the descriptive statistics in Table 9 and Figure 6 show, 70% of 
the “martyrs” died on Friday and Saturday (i.e., in demonstrations that occurred during the 
22 In Online Appendix Table 13, we investigate the effect of the protests on women’s decision-making relying on a wide-
ranging set of questions asked to currently married women. Women are, in general, less likely to make decisions regarding 
making household purchases for daily needs, visits to family, friends and relatives, getting medical treatment or advice. They 
are also less likely to take children to the doctor and to send children to school on a daily basis. However, we find that women 
were more likely to deal with children’s school and teachers, and to buy clothes and other needs for children. Overall, this 
table confirms that changes in social norms do not represent the main mechanism explaining the increase in female labor force 
participation.  
23 Since we rely on panel data from the 2006 and 2012 rounds of the ELMPS, we lose information on the 2012 refresher sample 
(2,000 households), which over-samples areas with high migration rates. See also Wahba (2014). 
 17 
                                                          
weekend). This suggests that there was little substitution between protests and labor market 
activities24. To participate in the demonstrations, people tended to reduce their leisure activities 
more than their labor supply.  
Discrimination cannot explain our findings either. When we consider results by educational 
attainment (Online Appendix Table 3), we find an increase in labor force participation after the 
revolution for women with primary and secondary education (for the former category the effect 
is less precisely estimated). From Online Appendix Table 7, we know that pre-revolution 
hourly wages of women with primary and secondary education are not below those of men 
with similar levels of education. Therefore the hypothesis of firms preferring to hire workers 
who are relatively less expensive does not seem to be the mechanism that increases women’s 
private sector employment.    
Finally, we have estimated the effects of the protests on children’s education (see Online 
Appendix Table 8). In these regressions we consider as dependent variables a dummy equal to 
1 if the child goes to school (0 otherwise) or a dummy equal to 1 if the child goes to religious 
school (0 otherwise). The IV coefficients of interest are never statistically significant, which 
suggests no effect of the protests on children’s education.  
To summarize the results of this section, the most plausible channel for the increase in women’s 
labor force participation is a reduction in men’s working hours as well as an increase in the 
uncertainty of their future income flows. This is explained by the fact that a large share of 
Egyptian men is employed in the private sector, which was the most affected sector during the 
Arab Spring. Women have increased their labor force participation to compensate for falling 
male incomes. The protests have also significantly reduced migration, but the small size of this 
effect cannot alone explain the large increase in women’s labor force participation that 
followed the 2011 uprisings.  
6. Robustness Checks    
Our results are robust to several checks. In Table 10, rather than using the governorate-level 
number of “martyrs” (demonstrators who died during the protests) as a measure of the intensity 
of political unrest, we consider the number of injured (Panel A) and the number of arrested 
(Panel B). We find the same patterns we describe in Section 5.1. In Panel A, the interaction 
term between the number of injured and the female dummy is always positive and statistically 
different from zero. As expected, the order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients is smaller 
than in Section 5.1. The estimates provide confirmation of our results, namely a reduction in 
the gender gap in labor force participation (see the IV estimates of column 2). The sum of the 
two estimated coefficients α1 and α2 is statistically different from zero in columns 4 and 6 as 
well (see the test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0): an increase in the intensity of the protests 
measured using the information on the people injured raises both women’s unemployment and 
employment. In Panel B, we consider the number of arrested by governorate to construct our 
measure of protests. The interaction term between the number of arrested and the female 
dummy remains positive and statistically different from zero when considering labor force 
participation and unemployment as dependent variables, while it is less precisely estimated 
when the left-hand side variable is employment. 
In Table 11, we present additional robustness checks using the number of “martyrs” during the 
first eighteen days of the revolution (Panel A) and in the subsequent period, from the 12th of 
February 2011 till the end of June 2012, after Mubarak stepped down and the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces took power in Egypt in the name of the military (Panel B). In Panel C, we 
24 There was potential substitution between protests and labor market activities for people working on Fridays and Saturdays, 
for instance in restaurants, small shops, etc. Also, although the demonstrations may have taken place across the weekend, to 
some extent preparation (or recuperation) for (from) the protests might have interfered with some labor market activities during 
the weekdays as well. 
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exclude from the estimation sample individuals residing in Cairo. Our results remain robust to 
these different checks. In Panels A and B, the interaction term between the numbers of 
“martyrs” and the female dummy is always positive and statistically different from zero in the 
IV estimates.  
When eliminating the observations related to individuals residing in Cairo in Panel C, we find 
the same patterns described in Section 5.1. The order of magnitude of the estimated coefficients 
is larger. Results of this robustness check are extremely interesting for two reasons. First, given 
that most of the public employment opportunities are in the capital, the estimates in Panel C 
provide additional confirmation that the revolution also increases labor force participation 
through a rise in private sector employment (see in Table 11 the test with null hypothesis 
α1+α2=0, when the dependent variable is employment). Second, the exercise in Panel C 
provides additional evidence on the relevance of our instrumental variable and allows checking 
whether the results we find on labor market outcomes are only driven by the inclusion of Cairo. 
Interestingly, we find that our instrumental variable captures the spatial clustering effect of 
political participation, even after omitting Cairo: the distance to Cairo remains highly 
correlated with our endogenous variable - the governorate level number of “martyrs” - which 
proxies the intensity of the protests. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic shows that the 
instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors. 
Our results are also robust when we use the number of male or female “martyrs” rather than 
the total number of demonstrators who died during the protests (see Online Appendix Table 
14) and when we normalize our measure of revolution intensity by the population size (see 
Online Appendix Table 15). 
In Table 12, we perform a falsification test of our identification strategy. To check the validity 
of the parallel trends assumption, we run a placebo Difference-in-Differences regression where 
we use information on labor market outcomes from the 1998 and 2006 ELMPS. Both these 
waves refer to a period before the beginning of the protests. In particular, our false experiment 
tests whether changes in individuals’ labor market outcomes between 1998 and 2006 are 
associated with the subsequent 2011 protests25. Results from IV estimates are in Panel A, while 
findings that rely on the OLS estimator are in Panel B. The estimates confirm that no outcome 
was differentially changing for women before the revolution, in areas that had more protester 
deaths compared to those areas that had few deaths during the Arab Spring protests. We can 
infer that our results are not biased by pre-existing trends in labor market outcomes across 
individuals who reside in governorates exposed to different degrees of protest intensity. This 
check provides support to the validity of the parallel trends assumption, which is the main 
identifying hypothesis for Difference-in-Differences estimation.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
Did the Arab Spring protests affect the relative position of women in the labor market? We 
have answered this research question using data from Egypt and a unique dataset that provides 
information on the governorate-level number of demonstrators who died during the protests, 
denoted as “martyrs” in our data source (Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution). We 
have used the latter variable as a proxy for the intensity of political unrest. 
Our estimates show that the 2011 Egyptian protests have reduced the gender gap in labor force 
participation, by increasing women’s unemployment and private sector employment. The 
effects mainly concern households at the bottom of the pre-revolution income distribution. Our 
results also show that the protests have negatively affected men’s working hours and have led 
to an increase in their income volatility. These changes have occurred because a large share of 
25 We track the same individuals we have in our estimation sample in the 1998 wave of the ELMPS and look at changes in 
labor market outcomes between 2006 and 1998, instead of changes between 2012 and 2006. 
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Egyptian men are employed in the private sector, which has been the most affected sector 
during the Arab Spring protests. Since the most vulnerable households are more likely to bear 
the burden of men’s increased income volatility induced by the revolution, women who belong 
to these poor households tend to increase their labor force participation as a household risk 
coping strategy.  
Egyptian women’s labor force participation has always remained very low compared to their 
male peers, even though women have become much more educated; a structural distortion 
acquiring the attention of scholars working on Egypt and the Middle East. Our results suggest 
that – at least in the short run – the 2011 protests have increased women’s labor force 
participation in the Egyptian labor market. While the estimations show that the change in 
female labor supply was mainly due to necessity rather than a change in social norms – the 
latter mechanism being unreasonable to expect in the short term – a relevant shock to the labor 
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Figure 1: The Numbers of “Martyrs”, Injured and Arrested from February 2011 to 
June 2013 
 






Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of “Martyrs” from January 2011 Till June 2012 
 
Notes: Data source is the Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution26. 
 
 
26 The five border governorates are Matruh, New Valley, Red Sea, North and South Sinai. They are not included in our sample 
since the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey we are using in the empirical analysis does not cover them. According to Minnesota 







































                                                          
Figure 3: Geographical Distribution of the Injured from February 2011 till June 2012 
 






Figure 4: Geographical Distribution of the Arrested from July 2013 to May 2014 
.  




Figure 5: Participation in the Presidential Elections and Distance to the Capital Cairo 
 
Notes. Data source is the official website of the Egyptian Presidential elections. On the vertical axis, we plot the participation rates in the 
second round of the Presidential elections between Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafik, in June 2012. The participation rates are calculated 
as the ratio between the numbers of valid and invalid/spoilt votes with respect to the total number of enrolled voters by governorate. On the 
horizontal axis, we plot the air distance between the Capital Cairo and the Egyptian governorates in Km. The figure shows a scatter plot for 
the 22 Egyptian governorates in our dataset as well as a fitted line from regressing the participation rates in the Presidential elections of June 
2012 on the distance to the Capital Cairo. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Number of “Martyrs” Per Day, from January 2011 Till June 2012  
 






















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Individuals' and Households' Characteristics 
Variables Observations 2006 Observations 2012 Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Individual level controls          
Ever-married 14,035 0.705 0.456 14,035 0.810 0.392 
No educational degree 14,035 0.315 0.465 14,035 0.310 0.462 
Primary/preparatory education 14,035 0.193 0.394 14,035 0.150 0.357 
Secondary education 14,035 0.339 0.473 14,035 0.338 0.473 
Above secondary education 14,035 0.153 0.360 14,035 0.202 0.402 
       
Household level characteristics       
Rural 5,499 0.479 0.500 6,850 0.496 0.500 
Male headed 5,499 0.869 0.338 6,850 0.879 0.327 
Household size 5,499 4.833 2.194 6,850 4.423 1.905 
Number of adults 15-64 years old 5,499 2.916 1.435 6,850 2.491 1.391 
Land ownership 5,499 0.170 0.376 6,850 0.112 0.316 
       
Household head characteristics       
Single indicator 5,499 0.017 0.129 6,850 0.007 0.084 
No educational degree 5,499 0.413 0.492 6,850 0.347 0.476 
Primary/preparatory education 5,499 0.161 0.367 6,850 0.169 0.375 
Secondary education 5,499 0.242 0.428 6,850 0.285 0.452 
Above secondary education 5,499 0.185 0.388 6,850 0.199 0.399 
       
Measures of the intensity of the revolution       
Number of martyrs 22 0.627 1.199    
Number of injured 21 7.946 28.540    
Number of arrested 22 2.232 5.953    
       
Pre-revolution governorate controls       
Share of public sector 22 0.161 0.037    
Number of police stations 22 0.061 0.045    
Mean youth education 22 10.330 0.848    
Population density 22 0.815 0.885    
Log of real GDP/capita 22 8.669 0.111    
Fully urban governorate 22 0.182 0.395       
Notes. All reported descriptive statistics refer to sample individuals’ and households’ pre-revolution characteristics in 2006 as well in 2012. 
The number of households in 2006 and 2012 differs because of the presence of several split households in 2012. A split household is composed 
from a single or multiple individuals who left the original household either alone or with additional individuals who may have joined them 
later. Individual level controls include a dummy variable for ever-married status, four dummies for educational attainment: no education 
(either illiterate or literate without any diploma), primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and 
above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). Household level controls include a rural 
dummy, an indicator for male-headed households, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old and a dummy variable for 
land ownership. Household head characteristics include: an indicator for the head of the household’s marital status being single and four 
dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Governorate level controls are summarized by governorate. The number of 
“martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in 
hundreds. The number of injured during the revolution is from the 11th of February 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is 
expressed in hundreds. The number of arrested is reported from July 2012 to June 2013, by governorate, and is expressed in hundreds. Share 
of public sector represents the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006. Police stations represent the number of police 
stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants. Mean youth education represents the average number of years of schooling for individuals 
aged 15-30, by governorate in 2006. Population density is equal to the total governorate population divided by the total land area in km2. This 
variable is expressed in thousands. The log of real governorate GDP per capita refers to the period 2005/2006. Fully urban governorate is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for the following governorates: Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said. 
 30 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Outcome Variables (Estimation Sample) 
































             
Labor Force Participation 0.574 0.494 0.05 0.461 0.293 0.455 -0.003 0.499 0.811 0.392 0.095 0.422 
Unemployment 0.043 0.203 0.005 0.279 0.051 0.219 0.014 0.304 0.037 0.188 -0.002 0.256 
Employment 0.531 0.499 0.045 0.448 0.243 0.429 -0.017 0.432 0.774 0.418 0.097 0.456 
Wage work 0.343 0.475 0.074 0.453 0.131 0.337 0.024 0.278 0.521 0.500 -0.021 0.453 
Employer/Self-employed 0.126 0.332 -0.002 0.335 0.042 0.200 -0.014 0.228 0.198 0.398 0.009 0.403 
Unpaid family work 0.158 0.364 -0.064 0.375 0.273 0.445 -0.105 0.474 0.06 0.238 -0.03 0.261 
Formal sector employment 0.211 0.408 0.026 0.321 0.111 0.314 0.013 0.225 0.305 0.461 0.041 0.405 
Informal sector employment 0.274 0.446 -0.007 0.405 0.107 0.310 -0.058 0.309 0.432 0.495 0.052 0.487 
Public sector employment 0.174 0.379 0.014 0.289 0.108 0.311 0.012 0.218 0.229 0.420 0.016 0.338 
Private sector employment 0.356 0.479 0.03 0.445 0.134 0.341 -0.031 0.385 0.544 0.498 0.082 0.485 
Log of real hourly wage 0.823 0.796 0.181 0.893 1.036 1.030 0.009 1.057 0.778 0.729 0.217 0.851 
Log of real monthly wage 3.899 2.974 1.114 2.329 3.187 3.025 0.342 1.157 4.088 2.932 1.250 2.454 
Hours of work/week 46.460 18.110 -1.133 19.680 30.440 17.770 4.025 18.33 50.71 15.65 -1.997 19.770 
Notes. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those 
who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Wage work, employer, self-employed and 
unpaid family work are defined according to the current work status in primary job, reference period 3 months. Formal and informal sectors employment are defined according to the incidence of work contract and social 
security in primary job, reference period 3 months. Public and private sectors employment are defined according to the economic sector of primary job, reference period 1 week. Monthly and hourly wages are calculated 
in constant 2006 Egyptian Pounds and refer to the monthly/hourly wage in primary job, conditional on being employed, in log specification. The hours of work refer to the current number of work hours per week, 
excluding subsistence work (market definition of economic activity) and conditional on being employed. Initial mean of outcome refers to the mean in 2006. Mean of change in outcome refers to the mean of the first-









Table 3: First Stage Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Martyrs Martyrs × female Martyrs Martyrs × female 
          
Distance to the Capital -0.527*** 0.001 -0.268*** -0.000 
 [0.071] [0.002] [0.026] [0.001] 
Distance to the Capital × female -0.029* -0.557*** -0.016** -0.285*** 
 [0.015] [0.075] [0.007] [0.027] 
     
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.198 0.324 0.803 0.837 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate controls   YES YES 
First stage F-statistic 27.950 28.040 54.880 54.850 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS estimation. The reported results correspond to the first stage regressions of the 
2SLS estimation approach, where the distance to the capital Cairo (in hundreds of kilometers) and the distance to the capital Cairo (in hundreds 
of kilometers) interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between 
the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of 
January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-
differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). Individual controls include the following 
variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory 
education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university 
education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls 
include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of 
adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies 
for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their 
interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by 
governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population 
density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban 
governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the 
community level. The reported F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test 















Table 4: Labor Force Participation, Unemployment and Employment 
  Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs × female 0.019*** 0.097*** 0.005 0.138*** 0.001 0.018*** 0.009 0.053*** 0.018*** 0.079*** -0.004 0.085** 
 [0.005] [0.021] [0.010] [0.036] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.016] [0.005] [0.020] [0.009] [0.035] 
Martyrs -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.000 -0.028** -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 -0.013 -0.008* -0.012 0.006 -0.015 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.005] [0.014] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.018] 
             
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.131 0.095 0.142 0.123 0.043 0.038 0.045 0.039 0.087 0.063 0.097 0.088 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.055 0.000 0.599 0.001 0.397 0.010 0.608 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.787 0.018 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   20.936   39.467   20.936   39.467   20.936   39.467 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in 
Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period for the 
labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of 
economic activity (see ILO, 1982).Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory 
education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either 
illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 
64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls 
include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, 
the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy 
variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. 





Table 5: Public and Private Sector Employment 
 Private sector employment Public sector employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                  
Martyrs × female 0.015** 0.066*** -0.012 0.059* 0.003 0.014** 0.007 0.027* 
 [0.006] [0.020] [0.010] [0.034] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.016] 
Martyrs -0.003 0.003 0.014* 0.014 -0.004 -0.015*** -0.007 -0.026* 
 [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.018] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] 
         
Observations 13,919 13,919 13,919 13,919 13,919 13,919 13,919 13,919 
R-squared 0.048 0.023 0.060 0.051 0.029 0.027 0.031 0.029 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.002 0.000 0.772 0.014 0.597 0.738 0.893 0.900 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   20.883   39.500   20.883   39.500 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in 
Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Private and public sector employment are defined according to the economic sector of primary job, reference period 1 week. Individual 
controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general 
or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). 
Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land 
ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as 
their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling 
for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates 
(Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first 
stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a 
test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect women’s outcomes of interest. 
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Table 6: Differential gender effects of the protests on Monthly, Hourly wages and Hours worked per week 
 Log of Monthly wage Log of hourly wage Hours worked/week 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
              
Martyrs × female -0.061* 0.156 -0.000 0.090 -0.086 3.669** 
 [0.036] [0.099] [0.040] [0.108] [0.740] [1.604] 
Martyrs 0.008 -0.106 -0.000 -0.105 -0.818** -3.668*** 
 [0.022] [0.070] [0.021] [0.066] [0.409] [1.203] 
       
Observations 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 
R-squared 0.024 0.010 0.039 0.030 0.025 0.007 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 + α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.079 0.528 0.995 0.866 0.160 0.999 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   32.588   32.588   32.588 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in 
Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Monthly and hourly wages are calculated in constant 2006 Egyptian Pounds and refer to the monthly/hourly wage in primary job, 
conditional on being employed, in log specification. The hours of work refer to the current number of work hours per week, excluding subsistence work (market definition of economic activity) and conditional on being 
employed. Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary 
education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate 
without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a 
dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. The reference category is the non-working category. 
Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations 
by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by 
governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community 
level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% 




Table 7: Variance of Monthly Wage 
 
Log variance of log  
monthly wage (occupation) 
Log variance of log  
monthly wage  
(occupation and education) 
Log variance of log monthly wage 
(occupation and gender) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
              
Martyrs × female 0.002 -0.052*** -0.017 -0.103** -0.029 0.014 
 [0.005] [0.016] [0.015] [0.041] [0.017] [0.053] 
Martyrs 0.006** 0.029** 0.021*** 0.053* 0.003 0.028** 
 [0.003] [0.012] [0.008] [0.028] [0.003] [0.012] 
       
Observations 6,344 6,344 6,344 6,344 6,344 6,344 
R-squared 0.085 0.063 0.110 0.102 0.667 0.662 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.094 0.168 0.778 0.284 0.121 0.374 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   33.753   33.753   33.753 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in 
Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. We use a conventional risk measure: the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of wage. The monthly wage is expressed in constant 
2006 Egyptian Pounds and refers to the monthly wage in primary job. We construct this measure by occupation using 4 occupational groups, by occupation and education using 4 occupational groups and 4 educational 
levels, and by occupation and gender, using the same occupational groups. The occupational groups are defined according to the ISCO-88 occupation classification: low-skilled blue collar, high-skilled blue collar, low-
skilled white collar and high-skilled white collar. The educational levels are the following: no education, primary/preparatory education, secondary education and above secondary education. Individual controls include 
the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and 
above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include 
the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the 
head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a 
female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 
by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and 
Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. 
The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 




Table 8: Other Potential Mechanisms 
 
Migration Remittances Per capita household income 
Per capita household 
income including 
remittances 
Religious education Giving birth 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs 0.000 -0.008* 0.054** 0.010 -0.016 -0.131 0.013 -0.153 -0.007 -0.010 0.008 0.029 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.026] [0.090] [0.065] [0.152] [0.066] [0.166] [0.005] [0.019] [0.007] [0.019] 
             
Observations 3,296 3,296 3,296 3,296 3,296 3,296 3,296 3,296 1,330 1,330 2,889 2,889 
R-squared 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.012 
Individual Controls           YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 121.089 121.089 121.089 121.089 121.089 121.089 121.089 121.089 119.510 119.510 109.833 109.833 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo is used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate. The number of “martyrs” represents 
the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. The dependent variable 
in column (1) and (2) corresponds to migration at the household level. It is equal to 1 if households report having a household member living or working abroad. The dependent variable in column (3) and (4) corresponds 
to the log of the total value of remittances received by households in cash and/or in kind from all listed migrants, during the last 12 months preceding the survey. The dependent variable in column (5) and (6) corresponds 
to the log of per capita household income. The dependent variable in column (7) and (8) corresponds to the log of per capita household income including remittances. Remittances, per capita household income and per 
capita household income including remittances are expressed in Egyptian Pounds (EGP), in constant terms (2006 EGP). The dependent variable in column (9) and (10) corresponds to religious education (Azhari 
education). It is equal to the number of individuals studying at religious schools (Azhari) at the time of the survey over the total number of individuals currently studying at the household level. This ratio is calculated on 
a subsample of individuals who are currently studying at the time of the surveys in 2006 and 2012. The dependent variable in columns (11) and (12) corresponds to the first difference between the probability of giving 
birth after the revolution between the 25th of October 2011 (9 months after the 25th of January 2011 revolution) and the day of visit for the survey interview, and the probability of giving birth for the same time interval 
prior to the 2006 round, only focusing on married females aged 18 to 49 years old. Individual controls in columns (11) and (12) include the following variables in first-difference: three dummies for educational attainment: 
primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no 
educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma).  Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the 
number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-
revolution governorate controls include the following variables: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number 
of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully 
urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 




Table 9: The Number of “Martyrs” Per Day 
Day Number of martyrs Percentage of martyrs 
Monday 144 0.105 
Tuesday 43 0.031 
Wednesday 92 0.067 
Thursday 33 0.024 
Friday 746 0.546 
Saturday 207 0.152 
Sunday 101 0.074 
Total 1366 1.000 





Table 10: Robustness Checks Using Other Measures of the Revolution 
Panel A: Using the number of injured by governorate 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
        
Injured × female 0.000 0.009*** 0.000 0.003*** -0.000 0.006*** 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Injured -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
       
Observations 13,444 13,444 13,444 13,444 13,444 13,444 
R-squared 0.141 0.068 0.045 0.028 0.097 0.057 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.944 0.000 0.825 0.003 0.928 0.006 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  10.912  10.912  10.912 
              
Panel B: Using the number of arrested by governorate 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
        
Arrested × female -0.001 0.050*** 0.002 0.019*** -0.003* 0.031* 
 [0.002] [0.019] [0.001] [0.007] [0.002] [0.016] 
Arrested 0.000 -0.011* -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 
 [0.001] [0.006] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] 
       
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.142 0.065 0.045 0.020 0.097 0.062 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.667 0.012 0.522 0.009 0.296 0.057 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  5.838  5.838  5.838 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the 
capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of injured/arrested by governorate and the interaction term 
between the number of injured/arrested by governorate and the female dummy. The number of injured is expressed in hundreds and is equal 
to the number of injured by governorate from the 11th of February 2011 to the end of June 2012. The number of arrested is expressed in 
hundreds and is equal to the number of arrested by governorate from July 2012 to June 2013. A female dummy is included which results from 
first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all 
control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work 
status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic 
activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 
1982).Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for 
educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education 
(either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate 
without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed 
household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s 
marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls 
include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate 
in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 
15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 
and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV 
regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% 
maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests 





 Table 11: Other Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Using the number of martyrs during the first 18 days of the revolution 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
        
Martyrs (period 1) × female 0.017 0.197*** 0.016 0.076*** 0.001 0.121** 
 [0.015] [0.049] [0.010] [0.022] [0.013] [0.049] 
Martyrs (period 1) 0.001 -0.040** -0.008 -0.019 0.009 -0.021 
 [0.007] [0.020] [0.007] [0.015] [0.009] [0.025] 
       
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.142 0.126 0.045 0.040 0.097 0.090 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.183 0.000 0.366 0.003 0.318 0.015 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  39.238  39.238  39.238 
Panel B: Using the number of martyrs from February 2011 to June 2012 
Martyrs (period 2) × female -0.024 0.463*** 0.015 0.178*** -0.039 0.285** 
 [0.032] [0.137] [0.021] [0.056] [0.026] [0.127] 
Martyrs (period 2) -0.007 -0.095** -0.020 -0.045 0.014 -0.050 
 [0.015] [0.046] [0.014] [0.037] [0.019] [0.060] 
       
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.142 0.112 0.045 0.035 0.097 0.083 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.274 0.003 0.769 0.006 0.213 0.028 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  23.720  23.720  23.720 
Panel C: Eliminating Cairo 
Martyrs × female 0.062* 0.300*** 0.008 0.102*** 0.054 0.198*** 
 [0.034] [0.074] [0.013] [0.038] [0.033] [0.068] 
Martyrs 0.003 -0.053* -0.001 -0.018 0.005 -0.035 
 [0.016] [0.027] [0.009] [0.021] [0.017] [0.034] 
       
Observations 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 12,823 
R-squared 0.136 0.126 0.038 0.033 0.100 0.096 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.018 0.000 0.590 0.011 0.023 0.006 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic  16.985  16.985  16.985 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the 
capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between 
the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. In Panel A, we use the number of “martyrs” by governorate during the first 
18 days of the revolution, from 25th of January to the 11th of February 2011, expressed in hundreds. In Panel B, we use the number of “martyrs” 
by governorate, from the 12th of February 2011 to the end of June 2012, expressed in hundreds. In Panel C, we eliminate the Capital Cairo 
and use the standard definition of “martyrs”, fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 till the end of June 2012. A female dummy is included 
which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent 
variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the 
current work status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in 
economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity 
(see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three 
dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above 
secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree 
(either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an 
indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an 
indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution 
governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector 
employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of 
schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita 
by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 
corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, 
at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to 





 Table 12: Placebo Regressions: The Impact of The 2011 Revolution on Individuals' Labor Market Outcomes in 1998-2006 




































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Martyrs × female -0.034 -0.052 0.018 -0.054 0.033 0.127 -0.008 -0.053 0.016 0.010 -0.178 -0.126 -2.334 
 [0.089] [0.033] [0.104] [0.034] [0.035] [0.117] [0.044] [0.039] [0.023] [0.095] [0.151] [0.120] [2.323] 
Martyrs 0.040* 0.024 0.016 0.053* -0.020 -0.011 -0.005 0.068 -0.030 0.036* -0.017 -0.047 1.299 
 [0.023] [0.015] [0.017] [0.029] [0.020] [0.015] [0.034] [0.042] [0.025] [0.021] [0.083] [0.062] [1.759] 
R-squared 0.214 0.103 0.121 0.092 0.016 0.002 0.076 0.045 0.044 0.065 0.015 0.015 0.024 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.934 0.348 0.708 0.946 0.530 0.311 0.372 0.030 0.382 0.589 0.227 0.230 0.326 
Panel B: OLS Estimates 
Martyrs × female -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 0.020 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 0.007 0.018 0.001 -0.041 
 [0.017] [0.011] [0.018] [0.011] [0.009] [0.027] [0.011] [0.008] [0.006] [0.020] [0.037] [0.024] [0.731] 
Martyrs 0.020** 0.003 0.017** 0.007 0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.014 0.451 
 [0.009] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.030] [0.018] [0.464] 
R-squared 0.214 0.108 0.122 0.095 0.019 0.012 0.077 0.057 0.050 0.067 0.028 0.037 0.050 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.371 0.846 0.389 0.766 0.777 0.416 0.519 0.839 0.391 0.321 0.363 0.555 0.434 
Observations 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 6,085 4,419 4,419 6,066 6,066 1,517 1,517 1,517 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution gov. controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using IV regression in Panel A, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy, and OLS regression in Panel B. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of 
fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction 
term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work 
status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, 
following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Wage work, employer, self-employed and unpaid family work are defined according to the current work status in primary job, reference period 3 
months. Informal sector employment is defined as having neither a legal work contract nor social security in primary job, reference period 3 months, whereas, formal sector employment is defined as having a legal work 
contract and social security in primary job, reference period 3 months. Private and public sector employment are defined according to the economic sector of primary job, reference period 3 months. Monthly and hourly 
wages are calculated in constant 1998 Egyptian Pounds and refer to the monthly/hourly wage in primary job, conditional on being employed, in log specification. The hours of work refer to the current number of work 
hours per week, excluding subsistence work (market definition of economic activity) and conditional on being employed. Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-
married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university 
education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator 
for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. 
Governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate 
per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 
2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the governorate level. The table 





In Online Appendix Figure 1, we present an example of the Statistical Database of the Egyptian 
Revolution screenshot. The dataset covers wide-range information on the classification of the 
incident, type of incident, date, governorate of the incident, name of the person, site of the 
incident, cause of death, occupation, place of residence, marital status, name of the hospital, 
date of birth, date of death and incident report number. In the note below the figure, we provide 
for example purposes the translation of the description of one of the events.  
In Online Appendix Figure 2, we present a map of labor force participation rates in 2006. The 
figure does not show a strong correlation between labor force participation rates and the 
distance to the capital Cairo City, as opposed to the clear correlation between the latter and the 
governorate level number of “martyrs” in Figure 2. 
In Online Appendix Table 1, we summarize Egyptian governorate characteristics by the 
intensity of the protests. We check whether governorates with above median number of 
“martyrs” differ along a number of pre-revolution characteristics from governorates with below 
median number of “martyrs”. Governorates exposed to a higher intensity of protests have a 
higher share of public sector employment and are more likely to be urban, compared to 
governorates exposed to a lower intensity of protests. Apart from these two characteristics, the 
two groups do not have any significant differences along the other dimensions such as 
population density, real GDP per capita, average number of years of schooling for the youth 
population and number of police stations. In the regressions analysis, we control for potential 
differences in governorates’ characteristics by conditioning on the pre-revolution values of 
these variables. Conditioning on pre-treatment variables is a standard approach in the 
estimation of Difference-in-Differences specifications. 
In Online Appendix Table 2, we present coefficient estimates from a governorate level 
regression, where we regress the governorate level number of “martyrs” on a set of pre-
revolution governorate characteristics. All coefficient estimates are not statistically different 
from zero, which means that governorates exposed to different intensities of the protests are 
not significantly different along a set of pre-revolution governorate characteristics. 
Interestingly, we find a negative correlation between the governorate level number of “martyrs” 
and the number of police stations per 10,000 inhabitants. This correlation may suggest that the 
number of “martyrs” represents as well a proxy for the participation in demonstrations (the 
presence of police stations deterring the participation in protest activities) rather than just being 
a proxy for political repression. 
In Online Appendix Table 3, we investigate the heterogeneity of the effects of the Egyptian 
protests on labor force participation, focusing on differences in household income and 
individuals’ educational attainment. The table reports IV estimates where we split the sample 
by quartiles of the pre-revolution per capita household income distribution and by educational 
attainment (four educational categories)27. We only find an increase in labor force participation 
for women who belong to the two lowest quartiles of the sample distribution of pre-revolution 
per capita household income and women with secondary education. 
In Online Appendix Table 4, we investigate the heterogeneity of the effects of the Egyptian 
uprisings on individuals’ labor market outcomes, by religious group. Results concerning 
Christian working-aged individuals should be considered with caution because the sample size 
is small and the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors (see the 
27 We consider the following four educational categories: no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any 
diploma), primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational), and above secondary 
education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). 
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 value of the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald Test). Our results on the subsample of Muslim 
individuals are consistent with the findings we have presented on the whole estimation sample. 
Online Appendix Table 5 shows results from a regression in which the dependent variables are 
monthly wages, hourly wages or number of weekly working hours, and the main explanatory 
variable is an interaction term between the “martyrs” variable and a dummy equal to 1 if the 
individual is employed in the private sector in 2006 (0 otherwise). These regressions confirm 
a reduction in the number of hours worked per week for people employed in the private sector 
(see test of statistical significance of the sum α1+α2). 
Online Appendix Table 6 presents the correlation between women’s labor force participation 
(dependent variable) and their husband’s wage and its variance. Coefficients are from OLS 
estimates, conditional on individual, household and pre-revolution governorate controls. 
In Online Appendix Table 7, using information from the ELMPS 2006 we present descriptive 
statistics on the hourly wages (in Egyptian Pounds) of men and women for different levels of 
educational attainment: no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma), 
primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and 
above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). 
On average, men earn more in terms of hourly wages compared to women for the lowest level 
of educational attainment (no educational degree). Instead, women with secondary or above 
secondary education have higher hourly wages compared to men. This is in line with Said 
(2007), who analyzes the trends in real hourly and monthly wages, under the period of the 
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program. She finds that the relative rewards of 
women have significantly improved between 1998 and 2006, as they witnessed larger wage 
improvements compared to their male peers (mostly because a larger share of women is 
employed in the public sector, which witnessed a higher increase in wages compared to the 
private sector). Even after accounting for differences in characteristics amongst workers, she 
still finds that the gender pay gap has narrowed down and turned into a wage premium in favor 
of women employed in the public sector. 
In Online Appendix Table 8, we have checked whether the 2011 protests are reducing the 
gender gap in children’s education. We restrict our sample to children’s aged 6 to 15 years old 
and study the effect of political unrest on the probability of going to school at the time of the 
survey, as well as on the probability of going to a religious school (Azhari), conditional and 
unconditional on studying at the time of the survey. We do not find any evidence on a 
differential effect of the revolution on children’s education by gender. The protests do not seem 
to have an impact on the investment in children’s human capital. 
In Online Appendix Table 9, we report descriptive statistics on the spatial distribution of the 
“martyrs” during the 2011 Egyptian revolution, for the first eighteen days of the revolution and 
for the subsequent period, from the 12th of February 2011 till the end of June 2012, after 
Mubarak stepped down and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power in 
Egypt in the name of the military. 
For sake of comparison with our parsimonious specification (i.e., the first-difference 
transformation, see Equation 2), in Online Appendix Table 10 we estimate our Difference-in-
Differences equation in levels (Equation 1), using the OLS estimator. We condition on a similar 
set of control variables and include individual, governorate and year fixed effects. The two 
main coefficients of interest are α1, the coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the 
governorate level number of “martyrs,” the year dummy and the female dummy, and α2, the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term between the governorate level of “martyrs” and the 
year dummy. We find that the differential effect of the protests by gender (α1) is positive and 
statistically different from zero, in line with our parsimonious specification, Equation 2, that is 
the first-difference transformation. 
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 Since Equation 2 is a first difference transformation of Equation 1, some outcomes of interest 
are categorical variables taking the values -1, 0, 1 (after first differencing dummy variables like 
labor force participation, employment and unemployment). We have also estimated Equation 
(2) using IV ordered probit model (see Online Appendix Table 11). In particular, we fit an 
observed recursive mixed process model, using the cmp command in STATA developed by 
Roodman (2011), where the governorate level number of “martyrs” and its interaction term 
with the female dummy are considered as endogenous and are instrumented by the distance to 
the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with the female dummy. The 
table reports the marginal effects for each category (-1), (0) and (1). The IV-ordered probit 
estimations are highly consistent with the 2SLS estimations presented in Section 5.1. The 
category (-1) refers to individuals who participated in the Egyptian labor market in 2006, but 
not in 2012. The category (0) refers to individuals who did not change their labor force 
participation between the two years: either individuals participated in 2006 and 2012, or they 
did not participate in the labor force in those two years. The category (1) refers to individuals 
who participated in 2012 and not in 2006. In line with the 2SLS estimations presented above, 
we find that the differential effect of the protests by gender (α1) is positive and statistically 
different from zero for the (1) category. Instead, we find a negative and significant estimated 
coefficient for the (-1) category, which suggests that the protests reduce the probability of a 
woman to participate in the labor market in 2006 and not in 2012, compared to their male peers. 
We also find a positive and significant differential effect of the protests by gender, considering 
the (1) category. This finding implies that the protests reduce the gender gap in unemployment 
and employment. More precisely, the protests increase the probability of women being actively 
searching for employment in 2012 and not in 2006 by 5 percentage points and increase 
employment by 3 percentage points, when the effect is computed using a 1-standard deviation 
increase in the intensity of the protests measure.  
In Online Appendix Table 12, we investigate the effect of the protests on labor force 
participation, unemployment and employment, using a sample of couples only. To be included 
in the estimation sample of these regressions, the head of the household and his/her spouse 
need to be married in the two waves, 2006 and 2012, and need to be in the working age category 
(15-64 years old). We find results similar to those with an estimation sample of all working 
age men and women. The protests reduce the gender gap in labor market outcomes. Women 
are 11 percentage points more likely to participate in the Egyptian labor market, 4 percentage 
points more likely to actively search for employment and 7 percentage points more likely to be 
employed, when the effects are computed considering a 1-standard deviation increase in the 
intensity of the protests. The sum of the two estimated coefficients α1+ α2 is statistically 
different from zero (see in Online Appendix Table 12 the test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0).  
In Online Appendix Table 13, we investigate the effect of the protests on women’s decision 
making. The sample only includes married working age women in male-headed households. 
We consider a set of questions reflecting the decision-making process within the household. 
Women, who are currently married, were asked about the family member who has the final say 
regarding a set of decision-making questions. Our indicator for decision-making takes the value 
1 if the woman participates in the decision either alone or with other household members. For 
instance, a woman can take a decision alone, jointly with her husband or with her husband and 
in-laws and similarly, for men. Whereas, the indicator takes the value zero, if the individual 
did not participate at all in the decision-making process. The decision-making questions 
covered the following aspects: making large household purchases, making household 
purchases for daily needs, visits to family, friends or relatives, food cooked each day, getting 
medical treatment or advice for herself, buying clothes for herself, taking child to the doctor, 
dealing with children’s school and teachers, sending children to school on a daily basis and 
buying clothes or other needs for children. The answers to these questions are, to some extent, 
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 subjective. Importantly, they also cover a wide-range of domestic chores rather than reflecting 
women’s empowerment. We find a reduction in women’s decision-making regarding 
household purchases for daily needs, visits to family, friends and relatives, and getting medical 
treatment. Women are less likely to take their children to the doctor or to send their children to 
school on a daily basis. We also find that women are more likely to deal with children’s school 
and teachers, and to buy clothes and other needs for their children, although, for these decisions, 
we do not find any differential effect of the protests by gender. Overall, this table confirms that 
changes in social norms do not represent the main mechanism explaining the increase in female 
labor force participation. 
In Online Appendix Table 14, we investigate the effect of the protests on labor force 
participation, unemployment and employment using the number of male “martyrs” (Panel A) 
and the number of female “martyrs” (Panel B). The results from the sets of regressions in both 
panels are consistent to our previous findings. The protests lead to an increase in women’s 
labor force participation, as well to an increase in the probability of women’s actively searching 
for employment. 
Online Appendix Table 15 shows that our results are robust to the use of the number of 
“martyrs” normalized by the governorate’s population size, as measure of the intensity of the 
protests.  
In Online Appendix Table 16, we consider a sample of prime-aged individuals (individuals 
aged at least 21 years old in 2006 to 64 years old in 2012), to make sure that our results are not 
driven by sample aging between the two waves 2006 and 2012. This table confirms the 
reduction in the gender gap in labor force participation, unemployment and employment. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients is smaller than in Table 4. 
In Online Appendix Table 17, we investigate the effect of the protests on different types of 
employment by distinguishing between wage work, employer/self-employment and unpaid 
family work, using OLS and IV regressions. Estimates do not show any significant effect of 
the protests on women’s wage work or on the probability of being employer/ self-employed, 
as we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the two estimated coefficients (α1+α2) is 
statistically different from zero. However, we find a statistically significant effect of the 
revolution on unpaid family work for women. The protests increase the probability of being an 
unpaid family worker for women by 14 percentage points, when we compute the effect 
considering a 1-standard deviation increase in the intensity of the protests. Egyptian women 
increase their time devoted to home production, while also actively searching for paid 
employment. By contrast, we find that the 2011 protests have reduced men’s wage work and 
have pushed men to engage in non-wage work, such as being employer or self-employed. A 1-
standard deviation increase in protests’ intensity has led to a reduction in men’s wage work by 
10 percentage points, whereas men witness a 7 percentage points increase in the probability of 
being either employers or self-employed.  
In Online Appendix Table 18, we estimate the impact of the protests by distinguishing between 
formal and informal sector employment, using OLS and IV regressions. The informal sector in 
Egypt, like in other MENA countries undergoing structural and economic reforms, has played 
a major role in employment, especially in periods of economic adjustment and transition 
(Wahba, 2009). We find that the differential effect of the protests by gender on informal and 
formal sector employment is statistically significant. However, the sum of the two estimated 
coefficients α1 and α2 is not statistically different from zero (see in Online Appendix Table 18 




 Online Appendix Figure 1: Dataset on the “Martyrs” of the Egyptian Revolution 
 
Notes. Data source is the Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution. The dataset reads from the right to the left. The columns titles (in 
the first line) are the following: the classification of the incident, the type of the incident, the date of the incident, the governorate, the 
description of the incident, the name of the person, the site of death, the cause of death. The second line reads the following from the right to 
the left: Political event, breaking a sit-in by force, 04/09/2011, Cairo, breaking the sit-in of the 8th of April, Name, Tahrir Square, gunshot at 
the bottom of the neck. Other variables available in the dataset are the following: the individual’s occupation, place of residence, marital status, 
name of the hospital, date of birth, date of death and the incident report number.     
 
 
Online Appendix Figure 2: Labor Force Participation by Governorate in 2006 (15-64 
years old) 
 




 Online Appendix Table 1: Governorate Characteristics by Intensity of the Protests 
  Low intensity High intensity 
VARIABLES Mean Mean 
Share of public sector 0.147 0.174* 
Number of police stations 0.058 0.064 
Mean youth education 10.190 10.460 
Population density 0.512 1.118 
Log of real GDP per capita 8.643 8.696 
Fully urban governorate 0.000 0.364** 
Notes. All variables are pre-revolution governorate controls and are reported for two groups of governorates based on the median number of 
“martyrs”, from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012. The median number of “martyrs”, fatalities during the Egyptian revolution, 
is 23 “martyrs”. Low intensity are the governorates witnessing a number of “martyrs” below the median, while high intensity refers to 
governorates witnessing a number of “martyrs” above the median. Governorate characteristics are the following: the share of public sector 
employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of 
schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita 
by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Means of these variables are reported for governorates with a number of “martyrs” below the median and governorates with 




Online Appendix Table 2: Predicting the Number of “Martyrs” Using Pre-Revolution 
Governorate Controls 
VARIABLES Martyrs 
Share of public sector 12.519 
 [10.627] 
Number of police stations -20.974 
 [14.380] 
Mean youth education 0.341 
 [0.441] 
Population density 0.084 
 [0.119] 
Log of real GDP/capita -2.177 
 [1.767] 




Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS regression. The dependent variable represents the number of fatalities from the 
25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard 
errors are in brackets. The pre-revolution governorate characteristics are the following: the share of public sector employment by governorate 
in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 
15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 








 Online Appendix Table 3: Labor Force Participation Decision 
Panel A: By sample distribution of per capita household income 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
      
Martyrs × female 0.133** 0.232*** 0.089 0.047 
 [0.053] [0.089] [0.064] [0.040] 
Martyrs -0.027 -0.026 -0.001 -0.015 
 [0.027] [0.042] [0.027] [0.019] 
     
Observations 5,147 2,939 2,935 3,014 
R-squared 0.129 0.093 0.125 0.213 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.025 0.008 0.094 0.353 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 24.34 14.686 37.527 30.307 
     
Panel B: By educational attainment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES No educ. Prim/Prep Secondary Above sec. 
      
Martyrs × female 0.150** 0.095** 0.198*** 0.052 
 [0.074] [0.047] [0.054] [0.048] 
Martyrs -0.041 -0.021 -0.039 -0.006 
 [0.032] [0.037] [0.025] [0.015] 
     
Observations 4,426 2,704 4,751 2,154 
R-squared 0.031 0.210 0.177 0.027 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.092 0.036 0.000 0.308 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 17.598 39.145 32.361 32.086 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using IV regression, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital 
Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of 
January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-
differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control 
variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. 
The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity 
for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). 
Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational 
attainment (only included in Panel A): primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above 
secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree 
(either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an 
indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an 
indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution 
governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector 
employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of 
schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita 
by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic 
corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, 
at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to 





 Online Appendix Table 4: Labor Force Participation, Unemployment and Employment by Religious 
Group 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IV IV IV IV IV IV 
VARIABLES Muslims Christians Muslims Christians Muslims Christians 
              
Martyrs × female 0.211*** -0.323 0.062** 0.027 0.149** -0.350 
 [0.062] [0.328] [0.029] [0.122] [0.058] [0.333] 
Martyrs 0.005 0.250 0.009 0.032 -0.004 0.217 
 [0.019] [0.170] [0.014] [0.070] [0.021] [0.163] 
       
Observations 6,564 482 6,564 482 6,564 482 
R-squared 0.027 0.107 0.015 0.112 0.069 0.102 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.001 0.730 0.008 0.553 0.007 0.520 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 26.761 2.587 26.761 2.587 26.761 2.587 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using IV regression, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital 
Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of 
January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-
differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control 
variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. 
The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity 
for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). 
Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational 
attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-
secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any 
diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, 
household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status 
being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the 
following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, 
the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by 
governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a 
dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors 
in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression 
F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV 
size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect 
women’s outcomes of interest. 
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 Online Appendix Table 5: Differential Effect of the Protests on Monthly, Hourly Wages and Hours Worked/Week in Private Versus 
Public Sector 
 Log of monthly wage Log of hourly wage Hours worked/week 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
       
Martyrs × private 0.020 0.028 0.012 0.029 -0.610 -4.954** 
 [0.042] [0.110] [0.038] [0.101] [0.734] [2.320] 
Martyrs -0.014 -0.083 -0.007 -0.101 -0.520 -0.816 
 [0.024] [0.067] [0.026] [0.065] [0.436] [1.077] 
       
Observations 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 3,738 
R-squared 0.030 0.025 0.037 0.030 0.020 0.005 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.855 0.566 0.875 0.417 0.051 0.005 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 21.935 21.935 21.935 21.935 21.935 21.935 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a dummy for private sector employment in 2006 
are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and a dummy for private sector employment in 2012. The number of “martyrs” 
represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in 
level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Monthly and hourly wages are calculated in constant 2006 Egyptian Pounds 
and refer to the monthly/hourly wage in primary job, conditional on being employed, in log specification. The hours of work refer to the current number of work hours per week, excluding subsistence work (market 
definition of economic activity) and conditional on being employed. Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational 
attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category 
is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, 
the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-
revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a dummy for private sector employment in 2012: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the 
number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural 
log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 
3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect outcomes of interest in the 
private sector. 
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 Online Appendix Table 6: Association between Female Labor Force Participation and 
Husband's Wage and Its Variance 
 Labor Force Participation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 
        
Husband's monthly wage -0.018***  -0.018*** 
 [0.005]  [0.005] 
Variance of husband's monthly wage  -0.001 -0.006 
  [0.009] [0.009] 
    
Observations 3,708 3,708 3,708 
R-squared 0.034 0.029 0.034 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS regression. Our estimation sample only includes working-age married women, 
living in male-headed households. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. 
The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, is defined according to the current work status. 
The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity 
for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). 
Husband’s monthly wage is calculated in constant 2006 Egyptian Pounds and refers to the monthly wage in primary job, conditional on being 
employed, in log specification and first differenced between 2012 and 2006. The variance in husband’s monthly wage is computed as the 
change in the logarithm of the variance of the logarithm of wage between 2012 and 2006. We construct this measure by occupation using 4 
occupational groups, by occupation and education using 4 occupational groups and 4 educational levels, and by occupation and gender, using 
the same occupational groups. The occupational groups are defined according to the ISCO-88 occupation classification: low-skilled blue 
collar, high-skilled blue collar, low-skilled white collar and high-skilled white collar. The educational levels are the following: no education, 
primary/preparatory education, secondary education and above secondary education. Individual controls include the following variables in 
first-difference: three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or 
vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no 
educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a 
rural dummy, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership and three dummies for the 
head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables: the share of public sector 
employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of 
schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita 






Online Appendix Table 7: Initial Mean of Hourly Wage 
  Males Females Difference 
No educational degree 1.295 0.181 1.114*** 
Primary/Preparatory education 1.861 1.282 0.579 
Secondary education 2.318 7.435 -5.117*** 
Above secondary education 4.087 5.738 -1.650** 
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hourly wages are reported in Egyptian Pounds from the ELMPS 2006, for the different levels of 
educational attainment: no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma), primary and preparatory education, secondary 
education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). 






 Online Appendix Table 8: Gender Gap in Children's Education 
 Going to school Going to religious school  unconditional on studying 
Going to religious school  
conditional on studying at present 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs × girl -0.007 0.031 -0.025 0.048 -0.003 -0.017 -0.002 -0.032 -0.004 -0.025 -0.002 -0.044 
 [0.007] [0.028] [0.019] [0.058] [0.003] [0.019] [0.012] [0.042] [0.004] [0.019] [0.012] [0.046] 
Martyrs 0.007 -0.026 0.030* -0.034 -0.003 0.007 0.003 0.021 -0.003 0.007 0.003 0.022 
 [0.006] [0.019] [0.016] [0.044] [0.002] [0.013] [0.009] [0.030] [0.002] [0.013] [0.009] [0.031] 
             
Observations 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,856 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,647 1,647 1,647 1,647 
R-squared 0.009 0.005 0.021 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.014 0.009 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.954 0.783 0.698 0.775 0.018 0.493 0.854 0.716 0.007 0.220 0.926 0.502 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   12.363   28.567   12.353   31.000   12.073   26.735 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. Our estimation sample is children aged between 6 and 15 years old in the two waves of the panel 2006 and 2012. A dummy variable for being 
a girl is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. The 
dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is the first difference between dummy variable indicators for going to school at present in the two waves. Dependent variable in columns (5) to (8) is the first difference between 
dummy variable indicators for going to religious school (Azhari) at present in the two waves, unconditional on studying. The dependent variable in columns (9) to (12) is the first difference between dummy variable 
indicators for going to religious school (Azhari) at present in the two waves, conditional on studying. Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed 
household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s 
educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the 
number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural 
log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 
3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect girls’ outcomes of interest. 
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 Online Appendix Table 9: Number of “Martyrs” by Governorate 
Governorates Martyrs 25 Jan 2011 - 11 Feb 2011 Martyrs 12 Feb 2011 - 30 June 2012 
Cairo 406 174 
Alexandria 132 5 
Port Said 14 74 
Suez 33 13 
Damietta 3 2 
Dakahlia 11 4 
Sharkia 9 9 
Kalyoubia 63 6 
Kafr-Elsheikh 6 0 
Gharbia 20 9 
Menoufia 20 4 
Behera 36 10 
Ismailia 19 9 
Giza 90 29 
Beni-Suef 22 0 
Fayoum 55 4 
Menia 0 14 
Asyout 3 14 
Suhag 1 7 
Qena 9 3 
Aswan 3 2 
Luxur 9 2 
Notes. Data source is the Statistical Database of the Egyptian Revolution. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities, by 
governorate. It is reported for the first 18 days of the Egyptian revolution from the 25th of January 2011 till the 11th of February 2011, when 
Mubarak stepped down, and from the 12th of February 2011 till the end of June 2012, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 







Online Appendix Table 10: OLS estimations of Equation (1) 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS 
        
Martyrs × year × female 0.020*** 0.001 0.019*** 
 [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] 
Martyrs × year -0.011*** -0.003 -0.008** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] 
Martyrs × female -0.106*** -0.014 -0.092*** 
 [0.031] [0.012] [0.035] 
Year × female -0.090*** 0.007 -0.097*** 
 [0.010] [0.006] [0.010] 
    
Observations 28,070 28,070 28,070 
R-squared 0.808 0.577 0.815 
Individual Controls YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES 
Individual FE YES YES YES 
Governorate FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS regressions. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from 
the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust 
standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the following labor market 
outcomes. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period 
for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market 
exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include 
the following variables: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory 
education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university 
education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls 
include the following variables: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 
years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the 
household’s educational attainment. Regressions include individual fixed effects, governorate fixed effects and a year fixed effect for 2012. 
 
   
 53 
 Online Appendix Table 11: IV Ordered Probit Estimations 
  Labor Force participation Unemployment Employment 
  (-1) (0) (1) (-1) (0) (1) (-1) (0) (1) 
Martyrs × female -0.065*** -0.011*** 0.076*** -0.029*** -0.002 0.031*** -0.039*** -0.008*** 0.047*** 
 [0.012] [0.003] [0.014] [0.008] [0.002] [0.008] [0.012] [0.003] [0.014] 
Martyrs 0.013* 0.002* -0.016* 0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.007 0.001 -0.008 
 [0.007] [0.001] [0.008] [0.005] [0.000] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003] [0.009] 
          
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
Pseudo R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.075 0.075 0.075 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes. Each cell represents marginal effects using IV ordered probit, fitting an observed recursive mixed process model, with the governorate level number of “martyrs” and its interaction term with the female dummy 
considered as endogenous regressors instrumented by the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities 
from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. A female dummy is included which 
results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. The dependent variable is a 
categorical variable taking values -1, 0, 1. The category (-1) indicates individuals who participated in the Egyptian labor market in 2006 and not in 2012. The category (0) indicates individuals who either participated in 
the labor market in the two years or individuals who never participated. The category (1) indicates individuals who participated in the labor market in 2012 and not in 2006. Labor force participation, unemployment and 
employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of 
market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for 
ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or 
university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, 
an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for 
the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by 
governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate 





 Online Appendix Table 12: Labor Force Participation, Unemployment and Employment (Sample of Couples) 
  Labor Force Participation  Unemployment Employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
             
Martyrs × female 0.017*** 0.086*** 0.004 0.092** 0.000 0.017*** 0.004 0.035*** 0.017*** 0.068*** -0.000 0.057 
 [0.005] [0.023] [0.011] [0.037] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005] [0.022] [0.010] [0.036] 
Martyrs -0.005*** -0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005 0.002 -0.002 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.009] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.007] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.008] 
             
Observations 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 
R-squared 0.121 0.073 0.136 0.12 0.015 0.004 0.023 0.017 0.187 0.157 0.201 0.193 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.008 0.000 0.433 0.008 0.995 0.000 0.205 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.843 0.092 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   25.850   64.384   25.850   64.384   25.850   64.850 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the 
number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 
2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. Our estimation sample only includes couples. Both the head of the household and his/her spouse are in the working age category (15-64 years 
old) and are married in the two years of the survey, 2006 and 2012. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 
1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period for the labor 
market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic 
activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or 
vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household 
controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership and three dummies for the head of the 
household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 
2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the 
natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets 
are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 







 Online Appendix Table 13: Decision Making 
 Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Decision 4 Decision 5 Decision 6 Decision 7 Decision 8 Decision 9 Decision 10 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
           
Martyrs × female 0.058 -0.130** -0.199*** 0.023 -0.189*** -0.058 -0.183*** 0.095 -0.115* 0.048 
 [0.056] [0.056] [0.051] [0.056] [0.047] [0.065] [0.047] [0.059] [0.061] [0.059] 
Martyrs 0.019 0.109*** 0.028 -0.020 0.089*** 0.052 0.157*** -0.032 0.138*** 0.026 
 [0.027] [0.033] [0.030] [0.039] [0.034] [0.046] [0.042] [0.036] [0.036] [0.044] 
           
Observations 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 7,416 
R-squared 0.064 0.054 0.033 0.054 0.025 0.032 0.022 0.082 0.043 0.049 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.088 0.568 0.000 0.908 0.006 0.864 0.422 0.104 0.572 0.073 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 53.139 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using IV regression, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of 
“martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to 
the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. Our estimation sample only includes couples. Both the head of the household and his/her spouse are in the working age category (15-64 years old) and 
are married in the two years of the survey, 2006 and 2012. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The 
dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. The dependent variables are a set of decision-making questions concerning who in the family has the final say regarding these decisions. Decision 1 
corresponds to making large household purchases. Decision 2 corresponds to making household purchases for daily needs. Decision 3 corresponds to visits to family, friends and relatives. Decision 4 corresponds to what 
food should be cooked each day. Decision 5 corresponds to “getting medical treatment or advice for yourself”. Decision 6 corresponds to “buying clothes for yourself”. Decision 7 corresponds to taking child to the 
doctor. Decision 8 corresponds to dealing with children’s school and teachers. Decision 9 corresponds to sending child to school on a daily basis. Decision 10 corresponds to buying clothes or other needs for children. 
Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary 
education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following 
variables in first difference: a rural dummy, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. 
Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations 
by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by 
governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community 
level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% 
and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect women’s outcomes of interest. 
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 Online Appendix Table 14: Additional Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Using the number of male martyrs by governorate 
  Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
              
Male martyrs × female 0.005 0.141*** 0.009 0.054*** -0.004 0.087** 
 [0.011] [0.037] [0.007] [0.016] [0.009] [0.036] 
Male martyrs -0.000 -0.029** -0.006 -0.014 0.006 -0.015 
 [0.005] [0.014] [0.005] [0.011] [0.006] [0.018] 
       
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.142 0.123 0.045 0.039 0.097 0.088 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.591 0.001 0.608 0.003 0.774 0.018 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   39.644   39.644   39.644 
  
Panel B: Using the number of female martyrs by governorate 
  Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
              
Female martyrs × female 0.001 0.066*** 0.004 0.025*** -0.003 0.041** 
 [0.005] [0.018] [0.003] [0.008] [0.004] [0.017] 
Female martyrs -0.001 -0.013** -0.002 -0.006 0.002 -0.007 
 [0.002] [0.006] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.008] 
       
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.142 0.117 0.045 0.037 0.097 0.085 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution Governorate Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.989 0.001 0.618 0.004 0.708 0.021 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   26.836   27.836   28.836 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the 
capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between 
the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. In Panel A, we use the number of male “martyrs” by governorate from 25th 
of January 2011 till the end of June 2012, expressed in hundreds. In Panel B we use the number of female “martyrs” by governorate from 25th 
of January 2011 till the end of June 2012, expressed in units. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation 
in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-
differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period 
for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market 
exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include 
the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and 
preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or 
university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household 
controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number 
of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three 
dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well 
as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations 
by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the 
population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully 
urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered 
at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-
Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The 
table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect women’s outcomes of 
interest. 
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 Online Appendix Table 15: Robustness Checks Using the Normalized Number of “Martyrs” by Population Size 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs per 100,000 inhabitants × female 0.014*** 0.083*** 0.001 0.077*** -0.001 0.015*** -0.004 0.029*** 0.015*** 0.068*** 0.006 0.047** 
 [0.004] [0.016] [0.011] [0.019] [0.002] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.003] [0.016] [0.010] [0.019] 
Martyrs per 100,000 inhabitants -0.008*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015** -0.003* -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006** -0.010* 0.004 -0.008 
 [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.002] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] 
             
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.132 0.068 0.142 0.134 0.044 0.033 0.045 0.040 0.088 0.049 0.097 0.095 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.076 0.000 0.714 0.000 0.027 0.009 0.251 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.165 0.014 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   26.029   78.436   26.029   78.436   26.029   78.436 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number 
of “martyrs” per 100,000 inhabitants by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” per 100,000 inhabitants by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” per 100,000 inhabitants 
represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, normalized by population size in each governorate. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in 
level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and employment are defined according 
to the current work status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market exchange and excludes subsistence 
workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational 
attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category 
is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the 
number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution 
governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 
10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 
and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size 






 Online Appendix Table 16: Labor Force Participation, Unemployment and Employment (prime-aged individuals) 
 Labor Force Participation Unemployment Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs × female 0.013*** 0.088*** 0.002 0.132*** 0.001 0.017*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.012** 0.071*** -0.005 0.091** 
 [0.005] [0.021] [0.011] [0.037] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.014] [0.005] [0.021] [0.010] [0.037] 
Martyrs -0.008*** -0.010* 0.003 -0.015 -0.004 -0.008* -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 0.007 -0.005 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.012] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.010] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.015] 
             
Observations 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 11,238 
R-squared 0.033 -0.018 0.046 0.018 0.016 0.011 0.018 0.013 0.038 0.002 0.051 0.035 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.210 0.000 0.650 0.001 0.198 0.056 0.671 0.012 0.019 0.000 0.804 0.009 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   20.52   35.966   20.52   35.966   20.52   35.966 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number 
of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. In this regression table, we consider a sample of prime-aged individuals (aged at least 21 years 
old in 2006). The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from 
first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Labor force participation, unemployment and 
employment are defined according to the current work status. The reference period for the labor market information is 3 months. The labor force includes all those who are engaged in economic activity for purposes of market 
exchange and excludes subsistence workers, following the market definition of economic activity (see ILO, 1982). Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married 
status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education 
and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed 
household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s 
educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number 
of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP 
per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the 
community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 







 Online Appendix Table 17: Wage work, self-employment and unpaid family work 
 Wage work Employer/Self-employed Unpaid family work 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                          
Martyrs × female 0.011*** 0.051*** 0.005 0.099*** 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.042* 0.020*** 0.056*** 0.007 0.110*** 
 [0.004] [0.012] [0.009] [0.030] [0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.024] [0.004] [0.013] [0.007] [0.034] 
Martyrs -0.009** -0.042*** -0.005 -0.080*** -0.002 0.019*** 0.007 0.056*** 0.004*** 0.012** 0.005* 0.010 
 [0.004] [0.010] [0.008] [0.026] [0.003] [0.007] [0.006] [0.020] [0.001] [0.005] [0.003] [0.010] 
             
Observations 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 14,035 
R-squared 0.070 0.060 0.071 0.060 0.013 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.042 0.021 0.048 0.021 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.298 0.073 0.923 0.183 0.075 0.004 0.178 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   20.936   39.467   20.936   39.467   20.936   39.467 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number 
of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the 
end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). 
The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Wage work, employer, self-employed and unpaid family work are defined according to the current work status in primary job, reference period 3 months. 
Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either 
general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). 
Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land 
ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their 
interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for 
individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, 
Alexandria, Suez and Port Said). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic corresponds to the first stage IV 
regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null 






 Online Appendix Table 18: Informal and formal sector employment 
 Informal sector employment Formal sector employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
                  
Martyrs × female 0.018*** 0.073*** -0.006 0.096*** 0.004 -0.009 -0.002 -0.039* 
 [0.005] [0.019] [0.010] [0.035] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.020] 
Martyrs 0.000 -0.018* 0.011 -0.052** -0.005 0.009 0.000 0.040** 
 [0.004] [0.010] [0.008] [0.025] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.020] 
         
Observations 10,649 10,649 10,649 10,649 10,649 10,649 10,649 10,649 
R-squared 0.043 0.024 0.057 0.045 0.058 0.055 0.059 0.054 
Individual Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Household Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pre-revolution governorate controls   YES YES   YES YES 
H0 : α1 +  α2 = 0 (P-value) 0.000 0.000 0.365 0.104 0.538 0.936 0.735 0.915 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic   21.228   44.017   21.228   44.017 
Notes. Each cell represents a coefficient estimate using OLS or IV regressions, where the distance to the capital Cairo and the distance to the capital Cairo interacted with a female dummy are used to instrument the number 
of “martyrs” by governorate and the interaction term between the number of “martyrs” by governorate and the female dummy. The number of “martyrs” represents the number of fatalities from the 25th of January 2011 to the 
end of June 2012, by governorate and is expressed in hundreds. A female dummy is included which results from first-differencing our equation in level (from the interaction term between female and 2012 in Equation 1). 
The dependent variable and all control variables are first-differenced. Informal sector employment is defined as having neither a legal work contract nor social security in primary job, reference period 3 months, whereas, 
formal sector employment is defined as having a legal work contract and social security in primary job, reference period 3 months. Individual controls include the following variables in first-difference: a dummy variable for 
ever-married status, three dummies for educational attainment: primary and preparatory education, secondary education (either general or vocational) and above secondary education (either post-secondary institute or 
university education and above). The reference category is no educational degree (either illiterate or literate without any diploma). Household controls include the following variables in first difference: a rural dummy, an 
indicator for male headed household, household size, the number of adults aged 15 to 64 years old, a dummy variable for land ownership, an indicator for the head’s marital status being single and three dummies for the head 
of the household’s educational attainment. Pre-revolution governorate controls include the following variables as well as their interaction terms with a female dummy: the share of public sector employment by governorate 
in 2006, the number of police stations by governorate per 10,000 inhabitants, the average number of years of schooling for individuals aged 15-30 by governorate in 2006, the population density by governorate in 2006, the 
natural log of GDP per capita by governorate in 2005/2006 and a dummy variable for fully urban governorates (Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and Port Said).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets 
are clustered at the community level. The reported Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistics corresponds to the first stage IV regression F-statistic. The Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values are 7.03, 4.58, 3.95 and 
3.63, at the 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% maximal IV size respectively. The table also reports the p-value of a test with null hypothesis α1+α2=0 to check whether the protests significantly affect women’s outcomes of interest. 
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